Grim's Hall

From the NY Post:

A critique of Donald Rumsfeld. The complaint seems to focus on two central points, which are supported by evidence. His two main complaints are:

1) The Secretary of Defense, and others at CENTCOM, have made implausible statements about the war going "according to plan."
2) The Secretary of Defense, and his civilian advisors, did not allocate sufficient troops for the war.

A short response, then we'll do point by point:

1) One does not hold a press conference during a war and say, "Our plan has failed, and we're improvising," even if it has and you are. We know that the Pentagon had a number of options on the table; and, further, that wars don't run according to plan. "The plan" in war is always a construct of contingencies--it's a chain of "if they do this, we'll do that, unless they do this, in which case we'll do the other, unless..." To hold any war plan to a standard of "it can't be said to be a success if you changed it" means no war plan has ever succeeded.
2) Horseshit.

Now to the man's own words:

As far as events proceeding according to plan, well, if your plan is vague enough, with a sufficient number of "branches and sequels," as the military puts it, even defeat might be presented as having been anticipated.

War plans are vague, involving branches and sequels. Journalists who don't like that ought to write about something other than war.

The much-heralded initial airstrikes failed and are now conveniently forgotten. The ground campaign assumed the lead from the first days of the war - which definitely was not according to the plan. And the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure.

The intial airstrikes did what now? The first occasion when a coordinated military response hit our troops was when we got to Baghdad. Iraqi command and control is so degraded that we haven't seen any kind of coordination farther from the Baghdad Bunker than you can drive a pickup without being shot at by Apaches. The Republican Guard units ringing Baghdad were reduced, officially, to 50% strength, 65% strength, but in fact were reduced almost to no strength--both the 3rd and the 1st Marine plowed through what was left.

As for the ground troops taking the lead, several strategems positing that were available in the public eye by early March. Look here particularly at the "Fast Roll," and see if it doesn't sound similar to what we've seen. The Pentagon probably had ten potential versions rather than a handful, all of which understood that adjustments would be made according to what cards the enemy played.

And as for this statement--"the number of ground forces permitted to the theater commander was inadequate by any honest measure"--how's this for an honest measure: Baghdad in 17 days with fewer than a hundred US fatalities? Sure, things could have been worse. War is fluid. But honestly: the troops committed have shattered the opposition with astonishingly few losses. That's a fair measure that the troops committed were sufficient to the task.

If you aren't convinced, try this thought experiment: first, think of what would have been different if the Guard had been twice as tough as they were. Answer: we would still have won, though we would have taken either longer to do it, or suffered more casualties, depending on whether we chose to invest them and take them with airstrikes, or fight through them. Now, consider what we might have done to make things easier. What would an extra division have really meant to our frontline forces? If we'd moved a bit more slowly, we might have protected our supply lines from guerrilla raids, which could have saved a few American lives--but not very many, because we haven't lost very many to start with. War is dangerous, but it doesn't get much safer than this. Baghdad may yet prove bloody, but as for facing the Iraqi army--we had more than adequate forces even for a tougher foe than we faced.

Fortunately, the 4th Infantry Division, denied access through Turkey, unexpectedly became available to rush to southern Iraq, where it has been much-needed. Secretary Rumsfeld may lack humility, but he does have good luck.


Still, Secretary Rumsfeld cannot have it both ways. Either he expected a short war, in which case he did not intend to deploy those heavy divisions from the States, or he expected a long war all along.

At this writing, the 4th Infantry is "weeks away from joining the fight in Iraq." Their equipment is in Kuwait, but the soldiers aren't yet, excepting a few lead elements. This assertion that the 4th's arrival was sorely needed is twice false: first, they haven't arrived; and second, no serious disruption of Coalition operations is resulting. The 4th may be used in the battle for Baghdad and Tikrit, which is what they were going to be used for had they been deployed from Turkey. That is to say, on this point the plan has changed only insofar as they are approaching from the south, not the north.

At one point in the long planning process, Secretary Rumsfeld's civilian advisers - not one of whom had served in the military - insisted the ground campaign would require less than 10,000 combat troops, who would take a Sunday drive to Baghdad after the regime had been toppled by technology. The generals had to fight bitterly to overcome such madcap notions.

Maybe, but what they got was a force of 250,000. The Marines alone number more than double the figure cited here. Obviously Rumsfeld listened to the generals--he just didn't give them everything they asked for. Between the stunning success he's enjoyed and the fact that it's really difficult to imagine a set of circumstances in which this force could have been bested by the Iraqi army, I'd have to say Rummy did all right.

Dangers remain before us, let's not kid ourselves. The ones in Iraq don't have to do with force levels, though, they have to do with counterinsurgency. The fall of Baghdad and Tikrit will mark the end of the war, and the start of the occupation. We've got a surplus of troops for the war, and more arriving for the occupation. The situation is well in hand (and remember how that statement traditionally begins?). If you want something to worry about, turn your thoughts to North Korea. That way lies peril.