NSA

This Seems Like A Problem:

I realize that (a) government secrecy is something that you've all heard me beat the drum about perhaps one too many times, and (b) there are good reasons for a certain amount of secrecy, particularly in national security matters. But how can this possibly be true?

The National Security Agency has warned a former intelligence officer that he should not testify to Congress about accusations of illegal activity at NSA because of the secrecy of the programs involved.

Renee Seymour, director of NSA special access programs stated in a Jan. 9 letter to Russ Tice that he should not testify about secret electronic intelligence programs because members and staff of the House and Senate intelligence committees do not have the proper security clearances for the secret intelligence.

Miss Seymour stated that Mr. Tice has "every right" to speak to Congress and that NSA has "no intent to infringe your rights."

However, she stated that the programs Mr. Tice took part in were so secret that "neither the staff nor the members of the [House intelligence committee] or [Senate intelligence committee] are cleared to receive the information covered by the special access programs, or SAPs."

The Washington Post has more on the question of how the Congress fails to oversee Executive Branch programs. It sounds as if this is a general failure of both institutions, the Executive and the Legislative branch: the Legislative for not insisting on full oversight and access to information on these critical programs, and the Executive for accepting the lack of oversight. I'm sure it makes things easier, but it's like permitting your drunken co-pilot to sleep through pre-flight: it's probably easier to get pre-flight done that way, but there's nobody checking your work. If the co-pilot is unfit, your job is to say so, not to try to do it all yourself. There's too much at stake.

The Department of the Navy shows the way:

The Navy has issued a new regulation heavily restricting the use of compartmented security classification to preclude or impede oversight of sensitive programs.

After an internal Navy audit begun early last year found that secrecy was being used to restrict Congressional, Defense Department and internal access to potentially controversial or even illegal activities, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a wholesale review of compartmentalization.

He is right to do so, and deserves praise for this course -- although the article raises other questions about the alternative he's proposing. "So here is a program for compartmentalizing information where the security standards internally are the same as an SAP, but the compartment is easier to establish and the program doesn't have to be reported to Congress!" Well, if that's what it boils down to, that's even worse -- although presumably the Navy wouldn't advise you not to testify to the Senate Select Committee.

We the People can't have full access to every bit of information, for practical and unavoidable reasons related to the need for some secrecy. Our representatives, however, have to have that access -- and they have to insist on using it, and use it well. They have failed to do so, and the Executive branch has taken advantage of their lapse rather than insisted on them doing their part. We must, as citizens, demand a higher standard from our elected representatives.