NIcomachean Ethics I.7a

Let us again return to the good we are seeking, and ask what it can be. It seems different in different actions and arts; it is different in medicine, in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What then is the good of each? Surely that for whose sake everything else is done. In medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any other sphere something else, and in every action and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, this will be the good achievable by action, and if there are more than one, these will be the goods achievable by action.

So the argument has by a different course reached the same point; but we must try to state this even more clearly. Since there are evidently more than one end, and we choose some of these (e.g. wealth, flutes, and in general instruments) for the sake of something else, clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be what we are seeking. 

So we are looking for the good that we seek from our chosen actions. Aristotle points out that there may be one, or sometimes more than one. He isn't interested in cataloging everything we want to accomplish with every action, however: he's looking for the chief thing that human actions seek. 

He has a couple of heuristics for sorting out what that chief good really is. One of them is that some goods are not pursued for themselves, but as a means-to-an-end for obtaining something else. Wealth, for example, is one he has already told us is always sought for something else. No one really wants piles of cash or coins to swim in, a la Scrooge McDuck; people want wealth for the other things they can trade it to obtain. Thus, even though very many of our actions are taken to obtain wealth, wealth is not a candidate for the chief end. Neither are things sought as means-to-ends for other ends: we should look at the final ends for our candidates.

Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

The second heuristic is a variation of the first. Some things we would choose as final ends, such as honor: it is right to do the honorable thing even if it leads to nothing other than the fate of having lived with honor. Yet such things, though worthy as ends-in-themselves, can also be chosen because they will reasonably reliably produce other things. Remember I.3: we are looking for rules that hold 'for the most part' or 'probably,' allowing for a world that contains chance and fate. An honorable action is worthy of choice even if it leads to death, but behaving honorably will reasonably reliably lead to other goods as well. It may lead to wealth, if it is rewarded; political success, if it builds a reputation in consideration of which people would vote for you; and whatever other end was being sought by the honorable action, as for example if it was courage in battle. The battle was being fought for some reason other than the opportunity to show honor and courage, after all.

Thus, while honor is a final good, it is not the chief and final good we seek. Aristotle thinks that happiness is a good candidate -- but recall that there was already a problem that people don't agree on what happiness entails. That still needs to be defined. 

From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship. 

For Aristotle's account of why humanity is born for some sort of political life, see Politics I.2ff.

But some limit must be set to this; for if we extend our requirement to ancestors and descendants and friends' friends we are in for an infinite series.

Aristotle has a significant account of the infinite. Potential infinites do exist for him, for example, one can potentially divide any single unit in half, in half again, etc. For mathematics the potential infinites suffice. Actually infinite series are impossible to complete, and therefore inadmissible to practical philosophy. It can't do in ethics to have an infinite series of obligations, for example, because no human being can practically satisfy it. We are looking for things that are practical in ethics. 

Let us examine this question, however, on another occasion; the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action.

OK, with the continued proviso that happiness hasn't yet received and agreed-upon definition. The thoughts of the Wise were dismissed in I.5. 

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or an artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be?

Here we are looking for the telos of human life, that is, the proper end of it. For those of you who read Iakovos' article on good upbringing mentioned in the commentary on I.4, you will recall that it begins with modern philosophy's desire to reject that there is such a thing as a single telos for human life. Iakovos has his own argument for why we should continue with Aristotle even absent a human telos.

We can, though, apply our practical reason to other parts of ourselves to find a telos. We can judge that the telos of our eyes is to see, for example, with a fairly straightforward application of our reason. We can then judge whether an eye performs its function well or badly. We reason that we should correct eyes that cannot see 20/20 with our optical arts. 

Note that we have the art to alter their vision further, and for some purposes that is appropriate: when you wish to shoot a deer precisely across a meadow, it can be helpful temporarily to see much further with the eye than 20/20. We judge that 20/20 is the right scale with reference to the overall human being: the eye's correct general telos is to see at that range because that is the range that enables you to participate in a complete human life most easily. At that range you can navigate a human city, read a human menu in a human restaurant, and otherwise participate in the life most fit for human beings. (See, again, the Politics for Aristotle's thinking on this.) 

Thus, even in the clear-cut case of an eye having a telos, we need to make reference to an overarching human telos. Modern philosophers may reject such a thing on the grounds that they would prefer the freedom to determine their own final ends; but regardless of why they reject it, they cannot practically do without it. Since ethics is a practical science, one cannot abandon even pragmatically necessary conditions; and therefore, says I, there's no getting around the thing. Just as Kant deduces that one must always act under the idea of freedom in his Groundwork (and thus that determinism, even if it were true, is useless in ethics), I deduce that a human telos is likewise necessary for ethical thought.

Tomorrow we will discover what Aristotle thinks human happiness is, properly speaking.