The View from Iran
"I offer my congratulations on the victory over the fallacious Zionist regime," a message posted Thursday on Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's X account declared. Another post added the bold claim that Israel's government "was practically knocked out and crushed under the blows of the Islamic Republic."
"Fallacious"?
Forget it, he's rolling.
Convincing, nay, Compelling Arguments
The thing is that we know that the same three liberal justices each speak more than any male justice during oral arguments. Justice Jackson speaks as much as three of the men put together. If they have come to that conclusion, it's on the basis of substantial evidence.
I was a little surprised by how directly the recent opinion upbraided Justice Jackson in particular. Whether or not they have become convinced that she is stupid, she has very plainly annoyed them.
Explorations of Liberal Patriotism
You couldn’t buy [Pop Tarts] where I was staying, but I loved them and still do. I also love McDonald’s. I love Thanksgiving Day parades and Fourth of July pool parties. “Mission: Impossible” movies and John Grisham novels. Holiday Inn Expresses and my hometown’s annual Corn Festival with a mountainous pile of corn right there on the street, which you can grab from and eat raw. I’ve been to every U.S. state except Hawaii and North Dakota and have loved things about each of them, so it is deeply confusing that Donald Trump and his allies keep insisting I hate America.
They have now collected letters on the topic. There's a lot of nostalgia, and of course homages to immigration ('nothing is more American than things that aren't' is a strange bit of logic, though it is true that you can get good Mexican and Thai food in much of America, whereas in either Mexico or Thailand it would likely be either one or the other). The nostalgia reminds me of the piece AVI wrote about Christmas and liberals.
All the same, though, it's kind of nice to see at least a passing attempt at patriotism. It's been all negative for so long it's nice to hear some positive things.
UPDATE: They probably won't mind if I borrow their graphic to give a feel for the thing.
I actually do believe that they love the weirdness aspect of America. There is quite a lot of that to love!
Nicomachean Ethics II.3
We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward.
This is where we start to begin to discuss degrees of virtue. Doing the right thing for the right reason isn't proof of being fully virtuous; the fully virtuous person will also experience pleasure from doing the right thing. If it pains him to do the right thing, even though he does it anyway he is only partly virtuous. Thus a man can be said to be a coward even if he stands his ground against terrible things.
Many people object to that; we have an aphorism often attributed to John Wayne that "courage is being scared to death, but saddling up anyway." Aristotle's point is that once you are fully accustomed to bravery, it feels normal and natural and therefore pleasant to be brave. You have to go through the habituation period in which it will be terrifying, but eventually it will not be so: it will become your habit, and therefore it will be at least comfortable to do it because keeping our habits is comfortable. There is even a pleasure in it.
For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.
Emphasis added. Plato says a lot of things about this; it is a major subject of the Laws (see sidebar for commentary).
Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.
The medical science there is a bit dubious, but this was very close to the beginning of medical science; Hippocrates was a contemporary of Plato's and an old man in Aristotle's youth.
It's obvious that you can apply pain as a punishment, so that fear of a whipping (say) will keep you from public drunkenness: however pleasant the drinking is, the contrary pain might hold you back. However, we are meant to apply contraries in 'matters of pleasure and pain,' so there must be sometimes we would 'punish' with pleasure. It sounds strange to say it that way, but in fact we do this. Aristotle says we abstain from noble deeds because of the pains associated with doing them; awards and honors are often publicly bestowed to encourage the doing of great things.
Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these- either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished. Hence men even define the virtues as certain states of impassivity and rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say 'as one ought' and 'as one ought not' and 'when one ought or ought not', and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that this kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary.
The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant.
This seems straightforward, though it runs into Aristotle's earlier discussion about the best kind of life being one that isn't common with animals, but one particular to human nature. We have in common with animals that we can be motivated by pleasures and pains; we are distinct in that we can use reason to challenge that base instinct when it is appropriate. An animal can be trained using pleasure and pain, but a man can train himself to ignore them.
Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.
Compare and contrast with the utilitarian school of ethics, which also holds that the whole of ethics is about pleasure and pain -- maximizing pleasure for as many as possible, and minimizing pain. That is definitely not what Aristotle is talking about here. He wants you to cultivate a character that will forgo pleasures in order to maintain health and strength; that will dare and endure pains in order to accomplish noble things. Seeking 'utility' is not any part of this ethic.
Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use Heraclitus' phrase', but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.
That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken as said.
Operation Narnia
I wonder why Israel named its campaign to assassinate Iranian scientists Operation Narnia. Perhaps the word has a Hebrew meaning that I do not understand. I know C. S. Lewis liked the sound of the name of an ancient Roman city called Narni, or Narnia; but I can’t see why Israel would be moved by the same appreciation of euphony. In the lands where Israel hopes to be approved for political murders, Narnia is the name of a cozy and magical land where animals talk and Aslan rules.Why would an Order of Assassins name their latest campaign after that?
I hadn't realized they did use that name, but that does appear to be the case. It was paired with airstrikes called "Red Wedding," which is a Game of Thrones reference. Interesting to find that their imaginations turn to English-language fantasy fiction.
Calling for a Color Revolution
Doctor Rathbun doesn't use the term of art, but it's what he means. The Asheville Citizen-Times published this opinion piece:
The normal course of the disintegration of government follows when the economic elites become swollen to the point that their wealth seems insufficient to them when compared to the competition. There follows an uprising in which one elite group plays on the resentments of the working class to mobilize them in open rebellion. What follows may be an armed uprising, with the elimination of the concept of human rights. Unfortunately, those naturally well-equipped to rise up in violent revolution are rarely well-suited as leaders in times of peace, causing the crowds to change sides readily as we move from one unstable government to another.
Just how a society can escape this nastiness is the subject of many books, of which my favorite is "Civil Resistance" by Erica Chenoweth, an academic expert on how nonviolent mobs can overthrow dictators. This author's research indicates that nonviolent resistance works better than the alternatives. The book explores the history of nonviolent resistance with the intention of laying out a detailed discussion of methods, some of which work much better than others.
I think we might have different definitions of "nonviolent," but this sort of thing has happened regularly in recent decades. What the good doctor may not realize is that such movements are not usually organic, but are nurtured by foreign powers. The People's Republic of China resents our usage of this technique, and has been trying to explain it to Americans through their embassy here. It's not exactly a big secret; NED had a series of panel discussions including of "the role of international actors in shaping the regional contexts for democratic transitions."
I suspect that we already did have our color revolution in the "fortified" election of 2020, and that the forces that might have come to his aid are already spent. If they could have done it again last year they would have. It'll be harder without the money laundering from USAID.
That reminds me, though, of how hysterical this same crowd was about the protest/riot of January 6th. That was said to be an insurrection; this is actually a call for an insurrection. Mostly peaceful, of course. A "nonviolent" overthrowing of the government.
No nationwide injunctions
Are You Minimally Qualified to Have an Opinion on Iran?
Nicomachean Ethics II.2
Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said.
Now, that we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed-it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues.
This introduction will be surprising once we have finished the work, given the crucial importance of a life spent in philosophical contemplation (theoria) to the highest degree of happiness. However, you can't jump into it; you have to do the work of developing the right kind of character before it becomes available.
But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.
This is a restatement of I.3, in case you missed it the first time. Most people miss it, which is why I have taken some trouble to emphasize the point. This is the core of understanding the EN.
But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it.
This is the first statement of what will prove to be a core concept of Aristotle's ethics: virtue is the proper balance between two extremes. It is not, as is often mistakenly thought, 'moderation' or 'the middle.' Sometimes the best course is very close to one of the extremes. This is, rather, a version of his concept of all sorts of motion (from the Physics) as being necessarily between two extremes. Motion is only possible if there are two opposing possible positions, and a substrate between them that allows you to shift from one towards the other.
Sometimes, in other words, nearly absolute anger is appropriate; sometimes nearly absolute bravery will be. Not always, though; and it is only because you have the capacity to shift from the absolute to something stronger or lesser that you can find the right degree for the present task.
So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.
Again, 'the mean' can be confusing. Many are confused by it. There is an appropriate amount in a given set of circumstances; it isn't just seeking 'the middle' regardless of the situation.
But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere of their actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things which are more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.
Escape from New York
Iron John: An Appreciation
In 1975, Bly organized a Great Mother Conference. Throughout the nine-day event, poetry, music, and dance were practiced to examine human consciousness. The conference has been held annually; since 2003 in Nobleboro, Maine. In the early years, one of its major themes was the goddess or "Great Mother", as she has been known throughout human history. Much of Bly's collection Sleepers Joining Hands (1973) is concerned with this theme. In the context of the Vietnam War, a focus on the divine feminine was seen as urgent and necessary. Since that time, the Conference has expanded its topics to consider a wide variety of poetic, mythological, and fairy tale traditions. In the 1980s and 1990s, there was much discussion among the conference community about the changes which contemporary men were going through, so "The New Father" was added to the Conference title.
Why would a man be the one to organize a "Great Mother Conference"? It was the thing to do in the '70s for New Age Men, I suppose. Anyway, he eventually got to thinking about how to apply the same sort of "mythopoetic" approach to the problems of men. It produced some genuine insight.
Iron John is described adequately at the link. Star Wars' success had made 'the Hero's Journey' a standard of literary education (even now almost every highschooler is required to learn about it). The Iron John myth is a Germanic variation of it that incorporated some elements Bly found helpful and instructive. The ones the review focuses on are the influence of the Wild and the need for masculine strength. This is where I want to add something that was missed:
At one conference Bly asked men to re-enact a scene from The Odyssey, in which Odysseus is told to lift his sword as he sails towards Circe, “the symbol of matriarchal energy.”
Journalist Tom Butler-Bowden described what happened next:
Peace-loving men were unable to carry out the lifting of the sword, so fixed were they on the idea of not hurting anyone. These were men who had come of age during the Vietnam War, and they wanted nothing to do with a manhood which, to feel its aliveness, required an enemy. Instead of the single-mindedness of the 1950s male, they had a receptivity to different viewpoints and agendas. The world is a much better place for these “soft males”—they are lovely human beings, Bly admits—but such harmony-minded men are also distinguished by their unhappiness, caused by passivity. Bly tried to teach these men that flashing a sword didn’t necessarily mean you were a warmonger, but that you could show “a joyful decisiveness.”
It's a little strange to describe Circe as "the symbol of matriarchal energy," but she does practice polypharmakos (she is, in other words, a sorceress as well as the daughter of a god). Hermes tells Odysseus he needs to show her the sword in order to begin the process of escaping her, and it works (combined with some other steps).
This was an important insight of Bly's that the study of myth and poetry produced. It is even more clear in Iron John. When the king's son wants to free the Wild Man in order to go on his adventure of coming-of-age and transformation, his mother the Queen holds the key to the cage. She will not under any circumstances give him the key to let him free the Wild Man and become a man himself.
Bly quotes the story's claim that the child steals the key from his mother, and then explains that the boy has to steal the key from his mother. It will never be given to him by permission. At some point, if he is to become a man, he has to learn to break her rules, defy her authority, and do what he has to do. Indeed he has to learn to break rules in general, to defy authority in general, and assert his own rights and legitimate power. He has to leave the safety and care Mother represents, against her will, and go to the Wild to face challenges and hardships.
Thirty-five years ago I was just the right age to encounter such a work at a useful period of time. I forget which teacher made us read it, or why; maybe just because it was a sensation at the time, maybe because it was about coming-of-age and we were all doing that. Perhaps the teacher hoped, as the Arts & Humanities crowd does, that boys could be usefully transformed with poetry and literature.
Indeed they were right. What I got out of it was that it was time to leave them behind for a while as well, defy my mother and her commitment to safety, and go out and have adventures. Obviously I eventually came back, as the Hero's Journey entails a return by the now-adult hero on his own terms. Just as we find in Aristotle, however, it isn't enough to know what is heroic; it isn't enough to lift a symbolic sword. The poem can only show you the way, as the good upbringing taught the youth stories of what courage and justice look like. To become courageous and just, you have to go and do the thing. You have to practice until it becomes habit, eventually second nature.
In learning to defy maternal authority to seek the truth of his own nature, the young man becomes a true man who is worthy of women. The adult women will need him to have his own seat of authority and power too, to not just be another boy they have to mother. They may at times value his ability to set limits, definitely upon himself, perhaps sometimes even upon them.
So kooky or not, I have warm regards for the poet Robert Bly. It was a helpful book, with some real insights. I wonder now if today's youth could read it, not because it isn't still potentially helpful, but because of the severe degradation of attention-span brought on by smart phones and such. Perhaps that, too, is another key you have to steal if you want to make the journey.
A Real Trade War
I'm related to a lot of men in the trades and this is both funny and informative. The video is useful for anyone considering the trades and the comments fill out a lot of information on other trades (like carpenter, machinist, etc.) that he doesn't mention as well as more info on some of the trades he does.
That said, I know a few welders and no way that's S tier. Maybe A, maybe, just for the coolness factor.
Assassination and the Laws of War
Similarly, Chinese columnist Bin Hua noted that Iran had recently tilted towards India and away from China.These apparent shifts in Iranian foreign policy may have now proven disastrous for the country and seem likely to have been propelled by a crucial change at the top of Iran’s government.Following his 2021 election, hardline Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi had enjoyed close relations with Russia and China, but in May 2024 he had died in a highly-suspicious helicopter crash along with his foreign minister, and given subsequent events, it now seems quite likely that Mossad had been responsible. Raisi’s successor Masoud Pezeshkian was a far more moderate political figure eager to restore good relations with America and the rest of the West and he deliberately avoided drawing closer to Russia or China lest such steps alienate Western leaders.Thus, it seems quite possible that a Mossad assassination had successfully diverted Iranian foreign policy in a direction that ultimately had dire strategic consequences for the country.
If that's true, it would be an unusual success for an assassination. They normally have only small effects, as personnel are easily replaced. They could have larger-scale effects in special cases, though: for example, the attempt on Trump in Butler would, had it succeeded as it almost did, have had titanic effects.
UPDATE: Apparently China has chosen to back Iran more forcefully recently, regardless of the policy change.
Nicomachean Ethics II.1
We will continue to take it slowly for now. This is one of the most important books in human history, and there's groundwork to do to understand almost every chapter. This one not least!
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).
It is enlightening to learn that "ethics" and "ethos" come from a word that originally meant "habit." It almost means "habitat," as it can be used for a dwelling place. It is the moral place where you live, and where therefore you are most comfortable. Home is where the habit is, the place where everything is done just the way you think is best.
From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.
Natural place is one of Aristotle's core ideas from the Physics and Metaphysics. It makes a lot of sense, can be directly verified by your own personal experiment, and by the way explains the idea that the earth is at the center of the universe -- it wasn't, as you have probably heard, arrogance on the part of mankind; it was rather an empirical observation about how things made of earth moved in the world. This idea suffused educated Europe: here's an example from 12th century 'science fiction.'
Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.
The senses come to be as potential in gestation, in other words, and are actual by childhood. The virtues exist in us naturally, Aristotle thinks, but only as potentials (and not, we shall see, in everyone equally). Practice is necessary to bring them out.
Note the interesting analogy between art and these moral virtues. Art/artistry/technology (techne) is actually one of the intellectual virtues, which comes to us (we have just read) by teaching more than by practice. You won't become a very good lyre-player by picking one up and, having never heard a good lyre-player nor met one, just fooling around with it. You learn building by studying with those who understand architecture, not just by going out and getting some rock and piling them up.
This returns us again to the idea that a good upbringing is needed for the development of moral virtue. You do have to do the work of practicing, but you also do have some initial learning to do. It's not that there is no learning involved in moral virtue, only practice: it is that you must first know what you are aspiring to do, but then you must also do the hard work of practicing the difficult thing until it becomes -- well, "second nature" as we will discover.
This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.
As mentioned before, this is a disconnect between Aristotle's idea of politics and our own.
Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced.
Indeed if you never play a lyre, you'll never be bad at it.
And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances.
The above further clarifies the analogy between art and moral virtue, and also the similarity between intellectual and moral virtue more broadly. Upbringing gets another mention at the end:
Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.
Nicomachean Ethics Book I Roundup
Talk Loudly & Carry a Big Stick
Apparently the big stick is really the key to this whole thing.
Frankly Israel deserves a lot more credit than anyone, if this holds. Credit is due chiefly to their decapitation massacre of the Iranian regime, their secret drone base that took out many air defenses, their airstrikes that cleaned up the rest, their assassination program that proved so intimidating. Of course it was chiefly their fight, so it's perfectly fitting that they did the heavy lifting. Still, they deserve credit for carrying that weight and for doing so effectively.
Yet the big stick on Fordow seems to have broken Iranian resistance. They lost the only thing left worth fighting for except their survival, which is apparently theirs to be had for the simple price of surrendering after a token, face-saving reprisal strike.
Before we committed, I wrote this:
Thus I suspect that, dissembling aside, Trump intends to issue the order.... Trump [reportedly] asked Israel not to assassinate the Ayatollah Khamenei. The reasoning given in the brief quote aside, a better reason to leave him alive is that he is the only one who can plausibly negotiate a surrender. You have to leave someone alive that the losing side recognizes as their legitimate leader if you are to have any hope of getting them to accept the legitimacy of the order to lay down arms.
With the air defenses already effectively destroyed, a US air campaign will face relatively easy sailing. I would expect the Fordow strike to be done in more than sufficient force to leave it obviously and permanently destroyed. The psychological effect of having that fortress reduced to ash in one night might compel the aging Ayatollah to consider surrender, especially if more generous terms than "unconditional" are truly on offer behind the scenes.
I feel pretty good about that prediction. All the same, as I noted just a bit below, Trump fooled me too on the timing: I thought he'd wait for the three carriers to be on station before sending the B-2s. He didn't; and he also didn't launch from Diego Garcia, which was a whole lot closer, perhaps to preserve OPSEC. The British would have had to have known if we'd flown from there; flying from Kansas City, Missouri meant that nobody but Americans would have witnessed any preparations.
We'll see if the peace holds, but if it does, a hard decision by the President may have spared the world a nuclear Iran. I understand why that was worth doing, though I hope very much that this is the end of the matter. It's a lot harder to stop the rolling stone than to start it.
UPDATE: An aside: has any American President ever before said, "God bless Iran"?
UPDATE: The Iranian Foreign Minister denies, but admits, that there is a ceasefire that may lead to peace in another face-saving move.
That's ok. Face-saving is often crucial to de-escalation; making room for them to say yes on their own terms is fine. As long as we get to peace, with a de-nuclearized Iran to boot, it's a win.
UPDATE: Reports say there were some early ceasefire violations, but that's not necessarily important yet. Iran's chain of command is badly disrupted. Their foreign minister confirmed the ceasefire, but that doesn’t mean every line unit has received the orders. Disrupting their chain of command is one of the roads to victory, but it does have the side-effect that it can also make it harder to stop the fighting.
Hezbollah: Good Luck, Iran!
If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em
The Bobarosa Reborn
The staff survived the hurricane and has returned to the place now that it's back in service. There's a bandstand on one side of the bar, picnic tables outside in place of the restaurant they used to have, and a campground they are still restoring a bit at a time. Still, there's food, drink, and music by the river, and a large number of bikers passing in and out. The beer is American and inexpensive, as is the food. (As for the music, the singer said that he'd had many requests, but was going to keep playing anyway.)
Riding Report: The Rattler
I wanted to ride to Hot Springs, NC today, which I had heard was a fun mountain town on a pretty creek.(More about this later.) The road between here and there entails a section of NC 209 that is one of the 'named' motorcycle roads locally, called "The Rattler."
Solstice
"Carefully Explain What You're Going to Do....
Reading the Iliad after October 7
Major Amir Skoury entered my class in October 2022. He was 30 years old, married with two daughters, and an officer in Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) special forces. Like many officers, he took a leave to attend college... Like all students at Shalem, he began his studies reading Homer’s Iliad, the great epic about the Trojan War. By the time Amir took the seminar, I’d been teaching it for nine years.Amir approached me after the second class and said he was frustrated. He couldn’t get into the Illiad. We had a short conversation, and by the next meeting he came prepared like a skilled warrior, not a young man enjoying a cultural experience. He learned the text as an officer would learn a map before navigating his company to its destination. I expected to meet him again on October 9, 2023, at the opening of his sophomore year, but instead, I stood before his grave and eulogized him. Two days earlier, Amir had led a team of soldiers toward the Gaza border communities that were being attacked by terrorists. He was one of the Israelis killed on October 7.
Juneteenth
I-40 Closed Again
The price of despotism
The price Iran has paid has not, in fact, been steep or cruel and unusual. In the history of mankind, no nation’s civilians have been safer while an enemy state controls their airspace during a live war. There’s nothing really to even compare it to. We are watching something no one has ever watched before. Israel, in response to Iran’s pursuit of the destruction of the Jewish people, not to mention its role in the worst daylong mass murder of Jews since the Holocaust, took control of Iran’s airspace and used that to patiently eliminate the sources of the Iranian regime’s power to oppress its people.
Trump supports this.
Nicomachean Ethics I.13
Since happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of happiness.
This answers some of the objections that have been raised in the comments. We have now a definition of happiness, but it entails a definition of virtue. We need to study the virtues now, in order to better understand even the defined concept of "happiness."
The true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things; for he wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws.As an example of this we have the lawgivers of the Cretans and the Spartans, and any others of the kind that there may have been. And if this inquiry belongs to political science, clearly the pursuit of it will be in accordance with our original plan.
Emphasis added. The student of politics isn't studying virtue to make himself better, note, but to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws. This is a point of discontinuity between Aristotle and American society, and to some degree between the Modern world and Aristotle. Americans think of virtue as a private matter. The function of the law is not to make us good people, but to set the most minimal limits possible on human behavior in order to enable us to be free within those limits. What we choose to do with that freedom is where we find out whether or not we are virtuous. It isn't anyone else's business.
Among the other Moderns, a less-strong version of this idea prevails. Kant, for example, divides his Metaphysics of Morals into two Doctrines: the Doctrine of Right, and the Doctrine of Virtue. The dividing point between those two is whether or not the state has the right to use physical force against you to require you obey. The Doctrine of Right is where force is permitted -- interestingly, marriage law is included here -- and the Doctrine of Virtue is where no one is allowed to force you to do the right thing. There is still a right thing, but it is yours to decide whether to be good or bad.
That is not true for Aristotle. As we will see when we reach his discussion of Justice, the point of the laws is to mandate virtuous behavior, to make everyone behave as if they were virtuous. You may not get genuinely virtuous people that way, but you at least get a society in which people are treating each other as if they were the virtuous people they aren't really.
Aristotle also wants people to develop the internal virtues, and to come to that point we have already discussed in which they want to be virtuous and find it pleasant to be. However, virtue is a matter of habituation; being forced to be better for a while can help you internalize the habits, and at least takes care of some of the bad behavior.
But clearly the virtue we must study is human virtue; for the good we were seeking was human good and the happiness human happiness. By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an activity of soul.
Thus, this will not be a book on weightlifting or fast running, but on courage and justice.
But if this is so, clearly the student of politics must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a whole must know about the eyes or the body; and all the more since politics is more prized and better than medicine; but even among doctors the best educated spend much labour on acquiring knowledge of the body. The student of politics, then, must study the soul, and must study it with these objects in view, and do so just to the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussing; for further precision is perhaps something more laborious than our purposes require.
Socrates would have taken this and made a problem out of it for showing that the inquiry wasn't working well. Aristotle manfully accepts that we have to understand the subordinate questions in light of our inquiry into the prior questions. This is a difference between him and his predecessors.
This is a longer chapter, so I will put the rest after a jump break. There's an important new concept here, so don't skip it.
On the Eve of War
Nicomachean Ethics I.12
Another short chapter today.
These questions having been definitely answered, let us consider whether happiness is among the things that are praised or rather among the things that are prized; for clearly it is not to be placed among potentialities.
As I've mentioned in the discussion of I.2 and I.6b, this is following a parallel argument from the Rhetoric. Aristotle holds, I said, that when "incomparable things are being weighted against each other -- should I prefer this meal, or that victory at war? -- honor provides the common ground for valuation." Here we are going to talk about things like that, but we have a further mechanism for differentiating them into the merely 'praised' versus the more valuable 'prized.'
Everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain kind and is related somehow to something else; for we praise the just or brave man and in general both the good man and virtue itself because of the actions and functions involved, and we praise the strong man, the good runner, and so on, because he is of a certain kind and is related in a certain way to something good and important. This is clear also from the praises of the gods; for it seems absurd that the gods should be referred to our standard, but this is done because praise involves a reference, to something else. But if if praise is for things such as we have described, clearly what applies to the best things is not praise, but something greater and better, as is indeed obvious; for what we do to the gods and the most godlike of men is to call them blessed and happy. And so too with good things; no one praises happiness as he does justice, but rather calls it blessed, as being something more divine and better.
So when we praise strength or bravery, a fast runner or even a just man, we are celebrating those qualities because they point to the easier acquisition of something that is a good in itself. Strength is good because it lets you do more work, which is good because it obtains whatever the end result of the labor was meant to be. Bravery is good because it can help you obtain victory in war and peace through strength -- but victory is good because it can bring a just peace, whereas such peace is good because it enables the best kind of human life.
This is to be contrasted with the truly prized things, the things we really want for themselves rather than as a mere means to something else.
Eudoxus also seems to have been right in his method of advocating the supremacy of pleasure; he thought that the fact that, though a good, it is not praised indicated it to be better than the things that are praised, and that this is what God and the good are; for by reference to these all other things are judged.
This thread will grow only stronger in the Christian period, though Aquinas and others will have to point out that the Goodness of God is not equivalent to the goodness of men; rather, that the word 'good' just has a different and categorically lesser meaning when applied to any created thing. Eudoxus was another head of the Academy, one of Aristotle's teachers as Iakovos was one of mine. Sadly, all of his works have been lost.
Praise is appropriate to virtue, for as a result of virtue men tend to do noble deeds, but encomia are bestowed on acts, whether of the body or of the soul. But perhaps nicety in these matters is more proper to those who have made a study of encomia; to us it is clear from what has been said that happiness is among the things that are prized and perfect. It seems to be so also from the fact that it is a first principle; for it is for the sake of this that we all do all that we do, and the first principle and cause of goods is, we claim, something prized and divine.
So there you have it. There's a little bit of an ambiguity in this discussion, as even the things that are prized are also praised, and encomia turn out to be just higher and more formal forms of praise.
The real issue is whether you seek the thing in order to obtain other things, or if the thing itself is your end. Happiness is an end in itself. Bravery gives you the victory, which combined with justice can give you a lasting peace, which itself enables the conditions for the best kind of life. The thing you are seeking in such a life is happiness, eudaimonia.
Nicomachean Ethics I.11
That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man's friends should not affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are numerous and admit of all sorts of difference, and some come more near to us and others less so, it seems a long- nay, an infinite- task to discuss each in detail; a general outline will perhaps suffice.
It is strange to see the philosopher weigh in against a doctrine as being "unfriendly." That is also how Terence Irwin gives it, though, in his translation. In the Greek original it is ἄφιλον, which is usually 'friendless' rather than 'unfriendly,' but I trust either of these translators' Greek more than my own very limited Greek. Harris Rackham's translation gives it as "heartless."
In any case it's not a proof or a logical argument; it's a sense that the doctrine isn't desirable and that it is widely rejected and without popularity. That doesn't mean it isn't true.
If, then, as some of a man's own misadventures have a certain weight and influence on life while others are, as it were, lighter, so too there are differences among the misadventures of our friends taken as a whole, and it makes a difference whether the various suffering befall the living or the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage), this difference also must be taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt whether the dead share in any good or evil.
That sentence could use some analysis. If some misadventures have more or less weight than others, then also our friends' misadventures may be more or less important to them. Also, it seems to Aristotle that it matters whether the misfortunes happen to a living or a dead man.
That's sensible enough. It would bother almost anyone if a financial disaster befell them that cost them literally everything they own; but every dead man immediately yields up all his worldly goods, and seems not to suffer from it much at all. The ancients sometimes buried men and women with grave goods, but not all of their goods; and even in the famous Viking funeral sequence recorded by Ibn Fadhlan at least some was left to the inheritance.
Aristotle says that this living/dead distinction is even more important than the truth/fiction distinction: a dead man seems to suffer less than a fictional one from the loss of his goods, say. So perhaps the dead do not suffer any evil, or any good. That was the unfriendly doctrine. It might be true.
For it seems, from these considerations, that even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it must be something weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if not, at least it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to take away their blessedness from those who are. The good or bad fortunes of friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy nor to produce any other change of the kind.
Some Sober Reflection on Trans Issues
[T]he one thing that’s maybe different here is there’s a set of narrow policies, like nondiscrimination, and then a broader cultural effort — everybody should put their pronouns in their bio or say them before they begin speaking at a meeting — that was more about destabilizing the gender binary.And there people had a much stronger view. Like: I do know what it means. I’ve been a man all my life. I’ve been a woman all my life. How dare you tell me how I have to talk about myself or refer to myself!And that made the metaphor break. Because if the gay marriage fight was about what other people do, there was a dimension to this that was about what you do and how you should see yourself or your kids or your society.I think that’s an accurate reflection of the overplaying of the hand in some ways — that we as a coalition went to Trans 201, Trans 301, when people were still at a very much Trans 101 stage....I think some of the cultural mores and norms that started to develop around inclusion of trans people were probably premature for a lot of people. We became absolutist — not just on trans rights but across the progressive movement — and we forgot that in a democracy we have to grapple with where the public authentically is and actually engage with it. Part of this is fostered by social media.We decided that we now have to say and fight for and push for every single perfect policy and cultural norm right now, regardless of whether the public is ready. And I think it misunderstands the role that politicians and, frankly, social movements have in maintaining proximity to public opinion, of walking people to a place....
I will say, while the left made this mistake of fostering an illiberalism based on a false sense of cultural victory, the right is now making the exact same mistake. I think they’re overplaying their hand.
They’re interpreting the 2024 election to be a cultural mandate that is much greater than what it actually is. And if they continue to do that, there will be a backlash to the illiberalism — the cultural illiberalism, not just the legal illiberalism — of the right, in the same way that there’s been a backlash to the cultural illiberalism of the left.
In general people like to be left alone. Making everyone put pronouns out there was not leaving them alone. That wasn't really the issue, though it was aligned to it. Telling parents that the state would take their children away and then castrate their children was intolerable. That's not just the sort of thing that causes you to lose elections; governments get overthrown over things like that. As well they should, since that action violates natural law in such a clear and deep way. Telling fathers they had to watch their daughters beaten up in sports arenas by physically more powerful males was intolerable. Telling parents they would lose their parental rights for not going along with all this was intolerable.
McBride may be correct that the cultural right is going to far the other way. It is good to see some actual reflection on all this, and likewise the admission that they went too far and were in fact illiberal. It's a genuine start.