Pragmatic Ethics

Andrew Sepielli proposes to ground ethics a priori based on pragmatic observations. But isn't that the very distinction between a priori and a posterirori? You might well ask.

I say that the true sin lies not in question-begging, but in failing to subsume aspects of the world within a more general vindicatory framework. For example, a theory of a priori knowledge that explains how knowledge of that very theory is possible might beg the question, but so long as it accounts for a priori knowledge in general – eg, of mathematics, logic and morality – and not just a priori knowledge of itself, it needn’t be problematic. A theory of accurate mental representation of the world that explains how our beliefs in that very theory accurately represent the world also begs the question, but this should not worry us insofar as it explains accurate mental representation across the board. These theories earn their keep by making sense of what would otherwise remain mysterious, and so it should not trouble us if they end up vindicating themselves in the process.

I propose to attain a similar sort of explanatory unity by vindicating all claims and domains that are worthy of it – not just ethics, but everything from biochemistry to sports prognostication – fundamentally in terms of values, be these representational, specifically ethical, or other sorts of values. It is this values-first re-imagining of enquiry for which I reserve the label ‘pragmatism’. Pragmatism offers a way of making sense of ethical truth, objectivity and knowledge by ensconcing these within a more comprehensive world picture, but not in such a way that would count as providing a foundation for ethics in some allegedly more fundamental area of enquiry. 

He's trying to avoid neo-Aristotelianism, which I have here characterized as a kind of pragmatism also. Aristotle has a kind of proto-pragmatism in his definition of goodness as 'that which all things desire,' and the good of a thing as that which is good for the thing. Sepielli explains that clearly enough, so he obviously understands the point. You can say that a heart is 'a good heart' or 'a bad heart' depending on how well it performs its function, and no one misunderstands what is meant.

What isn't clear to me is how you get to 'a values-first re-imagining' pragmatism that doesn't end up looking like Aristotlean philosophy here. If that's true, then you do have a ground of exactly the kind he says he doesn't want. It does end up grounding ethics, and successfully so: you can say that courage is a virtue because courage works. Cowards rarely accomplish their heart's desire, and if so only by accident; the courageous often do, just by the exercise of that virtue. So too the self-disciplined, the prudent, the wise.