Authority and Legitimacy

D29 links an essay with an interesting conception of what the terms "authority" and "legitimacy" mean. It's a little idiosyncratic, but it's a plausible frame for thinking about the problems Plato's Athenian has been encountering. (The essay, and its predecessor, are also worth reading in their own right; at least for those who accept that the recent election, characterized by outright violations of law and state constitutions, which were then blessed by all the courts, represents an effective end to constitutional government. However, I am here interested in the philosophy, not the politics.)

So here is how he defines his concepts:

I'll try to be more explicit about what I mean by the terms 'authority' and 'legitimacy'. Authority derives from the degree that a regime reflects the truth of human nature. Legitimacy refers to the degree that a regime reflects the views of the population it purports to represent. A bit of reflection will suggest that a given regime may be legitimate, yet lack authority--and vice versa, unfortunately. In an imperfect world, authority and legitimacy will normally be imperfect, as well. However, I take it as given that the regime established by our written Constitution had sufficient authority and legitimacy to command the consent of the population.

Arguably those are exactly the problems the Athenian is wrestling with in the last two books of the Laws. On the one hand, he needs a state that has legitimacy in this sense: the people who live under it will continue to consent to be governed by it. He takes it as read that some sort of equality is necessary to maintaining this legitimacy. So, in Book V, he proposes several approaches to ensuring this legitimacy, e.g., the complete equality of common ownership of everything, or the proportionate equality of his more complex system of tiered wealth.

Book V falters on the ground of human nature, though: the first approach is one no one will endure, anywhere at any time. The second is also one that is going to break up on the rocks of human nature, including the ordinary human activities of reproduction, economic activity, etc. These states can't exercise authority on these terms, which means that whatever legitimacy is gained is insufficient. 

Book VI has the Athenian turn to an important point of human nature, which is inequality: specifically the inequality of virtue, which enables only some to be trustworthy with powerful political offices. He has an elaborate system, again, designed to try to ensure that only the best people gain power and exercise it well:  that is, a system of authority that one could trust. 

The problem here proves then to be legitimacy: human beings will not accept that they are unworthy of equality of power, and will revolt against a scheme that sets out to rule them without giving them a share. The Athenian proposes accepting some schema that will allow the less-worthy to participate in government offices, but proposes that it needs to be minimized because it's terribly dangerous and destructive to give power to the vicious. 

So whether or not you think these essays describe our current conditions well, I think it's very helpful for trying to see the problems Plato is teasing out. Feel free to reference it in our discussions of the Laws.