You’re the cream of the academic world, with many years of study behind you. You're a graduate of Oxbridge, a leading red-brick or a pre-eminent international university. But sometimes academic excellence and a First or 2:1 degree don’t translate into just rewards. Now it’s time to put that right.That's over eighty thousand dollars a year. That's at least double the potential earnings of these same people if they should go into actually teaching the students, instead of doing the work for them. But that's not all! Both adjunct faculty members and online/distance educators are subject to terrible working conditions and punishing realities that are totally absent here. You can work from home or anywhere you like, on your own schedule, no BS conditions, exploitative assignments, unpaid extra duties, or training.
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All you have to jettison are a few principles, and the sky's the limit!
This would also appear to prove that, if we accept the market theory of value, it is more valuable not to learn than to learn.
The idea of monetary motives always seems to grind your analysis to a halt. Certainly a market value can be assigned to wrongful behavior, but it doesn't change the wrongfulness of the behavior. The wrongfulness here is not that money is involved, but that people are lying and cheating. Would we be less outraged if the liars a cheaters were motivated by something other than money? Pride, the need to humiliate incompetent students, a belief that the ill-gotten degrees would promote social justice and equality of income? Money's so not the point.
ReplyDeleteWe can grind to a stop at money, or we can stop elsewhere. I think, though, that we don't have to stop at all. It's possible to see both sets of values at once, and notice -- indeed, this is the point of the post -- that they are not compatible.
ReplyDeleteMore valuable? Only if one measures in monetary terms. Market systems are a tool, not and end. In the short term, that student may get a good grade on that paper or even that class that semester, or even get a degree as a result. Then what? When they hit the real world, and everyone realizes they can't reason or deduce beyond the middle school level (if that), they won't get very far, whether you measure by monetary metrics, or otherwise.
ReplyDeleteMore valuable? Only if one measures in monetary terms. Market systems are a tool, not and end.
ReplyDeleteI'll buy you a drink, Douglas, should we ever have the chance to meet. Remind me.
We can grind to a stop at money, or we can stop elsewhere. I think, though, that we don't have to stop at all. It's possible to see both sets of values at once, and notice -- indeed, this is the point of the post -- that they are not compatible.
ReplyDeleteI would point out that money is nothing more than a medium of exchange. An independent valuation of labor. I exchange my labor in the IT field for money that will be accepted by someone else (who may not even ever need IT labor) for their goods or services. In and of itself, money has neither positive nor negative virtue, unless it is your contention that labor is inherently a positive or negative virtue. It is how one pursues money that imbues it with (or denigrates) virtue.
But I am also willing to accept that I'm completely missing the point here.
If you have a duty to do something no matter what the cost, then you shouldn't charge a price for doing it. It doesn't matter whether you set your price in dollars or in barter, or whether the price is according to whim or a formal public market. You feed your child, for instance, without giving him a bill at the end of the meal as you would a restaurant customer.
ReplyDeleteIf you have a duty not to do something no matter what the inducement, then it's also wrongful to charge a price for doing it. Again, it doesn't matter whether you set your price in dollars or in barter or at random or by published price list. You don't hold a woman down so someone else can rape her, and it doesn't matter whether you'd be inclined to do it as a favor, or in hope of reciprocal cooperation next time, or for $10 or a priceless diamond.
But if you grow corn and someone in China grows lentils, neither of you has a duty either to exchange or not to exchange corn for lentils, nor is there any reason for you not to set a price at x lentils for y corn, or to convert that calculation into money so that you can settle up later.
When someone puts a market price on crime, it's not the market part that's the problem, it's the willingness to do the crime. A medium of exchange is a tool, as MikeD says, and it's no more wrongful than a screwdriver as long as an exchange was a lawful way for two people to deal with each other under the circumstances.
It's not at all clear to me that this is actually criminal, Tex. In fact it appears not to be -- the author of the papers isn't violating any law, nor is the company selling them. The only violation is of a kind of contractual agreement between the student and the school.
ReplyDeleteBut I intend this as a criticism of the "subjective theory of value," or market theory of value, which has been proposed by the Austrian school of economics among others. This is the theory that suggests that market transactions can't be exploitative because the value of a thing is just what someone is willing to pay for it, rather than some inherent or natural value; thus, any freely elected transaction is mutually beneficial because each party is getting something 'more valuable' by their own lights.
Now it seems that there is something intrinsically valuable about education. By trading money and the learning experience away in favor for not-learning, the student here is making a bad deal. This seems like a counter-example to the theory, which establishes that (at least some) goods have inherent values, and (thus) that the market's workings can sometimes be properly called exploitative.
Criminal? Who cares if it's criminal? I'm talking about its being wrong.
ReplyDeleteIs it valuable? Sure, in the same sense that's it's valuable for one person to drive a getaway car in a bank robbery. There's a going price for that kind of thing, and of course it's subjective, like all prices and like all practical value. Whether the price is too low or high, given the risks, the availability of getaway drivers, and so on, is a matter of economics and something that will work itself out by the law of supply and demand, which is to say the combined force of all the subjective determinations of value. But whether it's wrong to hire a getaway driver, or to hire oneself out as a getaway driver, is not a matter of economics or the market.
If all the student were doing was failing to learn, that would be no one's business but his own, and his problem to work out concerning whether he was wasting his tuition. But getting a diploma by false pretenses is a fraud on the world as well, and helping someone do that is abetting a fraud, regardless of whether it's done out of compassion or in return for a paycheck.
This is a conversation I'm having in parallel with you, here, and with a progressive friend of mine who is an educator. I am being Socratic, I will confess, which is to say that I'm asking each side the question I think will trouble you the most.
ReplyDeleteSo the question for conservatives -- especially those who tend to believe in the Austrian school -- is, "Doesn't this disprove the market theory of value, insofar as the person buying the paper is willing to pay more for something that is objectively less valuable? This seems like a clear cut case of a product having an intrinsic worth, which is out of order with the subjective value."
The question for progressives is, "Is the price right?"
Once you've deconstructed all value systems, in other words, what's left but this one? Here are some people willing to pay you a tenured-faculty wage, and you can live wherever you want and make your own hours. Why not?
Your question doesn't trouble me; the fact that you don't understand the answer troubles me.
ReplyDeleteYou're asking whether it disproves the "market theory of value" that someone is willing to pay more for something than it is "objectively" worth? And you think I'll find this question a stumbling block or a revelation? It's as if we hadn't met! :-)
As best I can tell, you're tangling up two concepts: your own conviction of the value of an education (in which I don't disagree with you), vs. a student's conviction of the value of getting an apparent diploma without having to do the work to earn it. Once the student decides there's no ethical bar to lying and cheating, or that the education itself is meaningless and the only important thing is whether he can get away with defrauding a potential employer, the only question left for him is "what will it cost me to get someone else to go to the trouble of writing my papers for me?"
As long as there's an ethical bar to doing something, there's no question of assigning a market value to the decision. As soon as someone decides that it's ethically neutral whether he does it or not, then the question becomes what inducement will be necessary for him to take the time and trouble to do it. The economic analysis doesn't bear on the ethical one; it's apples and oranges.
What any of this has to say about the market theory of valuation, or intrinsic vs. objective vs. subjective value, I have no idea. People place different values on things, and then have to come to compromises before they can trade. If they can't reach an agreement, each departs with what he originally had; there is no trade. Each also presumably continues to entertain whatever opinion of value he had to begin with, relatively untroubled by the fact that someone else didn't agree.
What any of this has to say about the market theory of valuation, or intrinsic vs. objective vs. subjective value, I have no idea.
ReplyDeleteThat's right. It's not that I don't understand your answer; it's that you're not answering the question I'm raising, but a different question. I don't disagree that you shouldn't do things that are wrong, even if they're well remunerated.
However, that's not what I was talking about. What I was talking about was the theory of value. Do goods have intrinsic values, or are they only worth what they are valued by the market? It's an important question, because what hangs on it is whether or not the market itself can be exploitative. The Austrian school's claim is that it can't be insofar as transactions are voluntary; I think that's wrong.
Whether you understand my answer or not I couldn't say. You've never reflected it back to me in a way that made me believe you did. I suspect we have different basic unstated assumptions, particularly about duties. For instance, I get the impression that a big point of disagreement between us lies in our assumptions about whether there's such a thing as people who are not bound by any duty either to trade or not to trade with each other.
ReplyDeleteI think what I'm hearing you suggest is that, if the "market" values something at x but the intrinsic value is y, then the "market" is exploiting someone. Is a potential buyer exploiting a potential seller if he values a good at x while the seller values it at x + 1? I would say of course not: if the seller disagrees, he need not sell. He's always free to keep his good if he doesn't like the price--and he obviously should keep it if he thinks it's all that fabulous. What he's not free to do is to force a sale at a price the buyer doesn't agree to. The buyer's totally wrong about the value and therefore the price? Fine. He's entitled to be mistaken, and to say no.
But you often say things that suggest you disagree with me on this, and that you believe people are obligated to trade with each other, at "right" prices, or at least that you don't distinguish sharply between such a duty and a duty of charity to people in need. Personally, when it comes to charity, I stop using the market system altogether and concentrate on what the other guy needs and what I'm willing and able to give. I don't try to make the "market" and "charity" work at the same time, or try to use the same terms or assumptions for both. That may be one reason why I have very little idea what distinction can usefully be made between "market" and "intrinsic" value. If people are desperate enough that they're not really free any more, I don't consider them eligible for the free market. They need gifts instead. Why pretend it's a free exchange of goods?
I still don't know what any of this has to do with the student who wants to pay someone to get his grades for him. What was the exploitation there, again? What good was being misvalued, and by whom?
Didn't you once tell me that your husband would rather have teeth pulled than try to 'reflect' statements? :) I feel somewhat like that, but if it will help, I'll try to engage in the exercise.
ReplyDeleteYou have argued that the moral calculations have to be done before the market calculations. You're willing to grant priority to the moral calculations -- if something is wrong, no market data can make it OK, and if something is obligatory, it's wrong to do it for a fee. However, within the sphere of things that are neither obligatory nor forbidden, the market is available.
We don't actually disagree about any of that. The point of disagreement is the degree to which, within the area where the market is available, the additional transactions are morally fraught. You seem to see no danger that a voluntary transaction is exploitative; I am concerned that power relationships mean that they very frequently are, though the transaction remains 'voluntary' in the sense that the poorer or weaker person consents to it instead of some even-worse alternative.
So, I do in fact recognize a difference between charity and moral market-work. However, I think that we have a moral obligation to engage in the market in such a way that we are not using power differentials unfairly.
All of that is to the side of the current question, though, which has to do with the intrinsic value of goods. (I.e., the above considerations would apply to some degree even where goods don't have intrinsic values.) That's why I am saying that your answer isn't really about the question that I was asking here.
You needn't ever explain yourself if you don't like! But if you claim to understand my position, I'm likely to challenge you, unless you've shown some evidence of it.
ReplyDeleteWe both agree that the market system is inappropriate for people whose participation isn't truly voluntary. We probably differ in how desperate someone's circumstances should be before it's unfair to expect him to deal with the rough-and-tumble of a market. By the time I get there, I'm almost ready to appoint a legal guardian, whereas I think you'd identify a much larger group, perhaps including anyone, for instance, who found it difficult to persuade anyone to hire him at whatever you think the minimum wage should be. But anyway, let's assume we've agreed that someone is too vulnerable to participate in a market without considerable protection. If I understand you correctly, you'd fix the problem by restricting the market. I come at it differently.
Where I think power imbalances prevent the freedom inherent in a market, I withdraw from the market and apply a different system. I extend that same power of decision to other people, in preference to "reforming" the market so that it tries simultaneously to accommodate voluntary transactions and charitable relief. In part that's because I'm extremely reluctant to define other people's charitable duties for them and enforce them by the police power--beyond duties owed to minor dependents.
When it's my money I'm handing out, I get to decide whether the right approach is the "market" system that's available for two free adults, or a charitable duty I may have for a helpless, needy person God has placed in my path. When it's another guy's money, I live with the discomfort of having to trust his judgment. You know how I feel about feeling charitable at other people's expense: even if it didn't feel extremely dishonorable to me, I would consider it a system that can never find an equilibrium.
I prefer my approach in part because it leaves the market to function properly, while permitting a complete solution to the problem of someone too vulnerable to survive by free-exchange rules. FOr me it's a little like saying that someone who's not big enough to play football should play something else instead; we needn't change the rules of football so that they accommodate players with broken legs. Or we might extend the analogy to eligibility for military combat.
Ok, my turn: why isn't my position on the minimum wage a good example of a desire to protect vulnerable workers?
ReplyDeleteIn general, I have a different mechanism in mind anyway -- not identifying vulnerable workers (or categories of workers) for protection, but identifying unfair mechanisms and practices for regulation. But the minimum wage argument you've seen me give is actually targeted at a wholly different problem.
(Your military analogy is problematic because we don't have a capacity to change the rules to protect vulnerable soldiers; the reason it's an exception is that weaknesses will definitely be exploited by our enemies and there's nothing we can do about that. The sports example is better: but we can regulate bad practices that tend to lead to broken legs, like roughing the kicker, without attempting to rewrite the rules of the sport to permit participation by those with broken legs.)
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ReplyDelete"I'll buy you a drink, Douglas, should we ever have the chance to meet. Remind me."
ReplyDeleteSir, when credited with good work by one you hold respect for, it's particularly meaningful, and I shall be happy to remind you given the opportunity.
"What I was talking about was the theory of value. Do goods have intrinsic values, or are they only worth what they are valued by the market? It's an important question, because what hangs on it is whether or not the market itself can be exploitative. The Austrian school's claim is that it can't be insofar as transactions are voluntary; I think that's wrong."
I think we can say that goods have intrinsic values, AND extrinsic values. A jug of water is valuable as it has the potential to quench your thirst, or water a plant, etc. but if it's sitting by a clean stream, no one is going to be interested in exchanging their work for it when they can take some themselves from the stream. Specialization introduces the ability for one person to do something in a way that another cannot, and therefore, by trading monetarily (stored specialized labor), we can make the most of our joint efficiencies. We are adding value to the system beyond the intrinsic, through the value of efficiency. How much is to be made of that becomes an extrinsic value that we have to come to come agreement on to make the system work. Keeping our specializations to ourselves has limited value to the society at large. Any attempt to fix that extrinsic portion of the value of something will cause problems because not all variables and combinations of them can be accounted for in any one fixed calculation.
"why isn't my position on the minimum wage a good example of a desire to protect vulnerable workers?"
Because it's not well established that they are in fact, vulnerable. The truth is, almost no one stays at minimum wage- it's a starting point, and indeed, anyone incapable of moving off the blocks is going to need more help than a minimum wage law. It's also true that around 70% of people will at one time or another, be in the top 20% of wage earners, and some 14% will even be in the top 1%. We don't have the kind of social stratification and stagnation that societies like Europe have.
Well, to be fair, it may be an example of the desire to protect vulnerable workers, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions.
Because it's not well established that they are in fact, vulnerable.
ReplyDeleteThat's not the argument I've advanced, though it might be an argument that someone would want to advance.
Going back to your earlier comment:
ReplyDelete"Once you've deconstructed all value systems, in other words, what's left but this one? Here are some people willing to pay you a tenured-faculty wage, and you can live wherever you want and make your own hours. Why not?"
That gets back to monetary systems being a tool not an end. At least, that's true from the perspective of most Conservatives, who hold values derived from other sources (Christianity, say). Progressives really don't have that- theirs is a more unified theory of both monetary systems and value systems. That's their problem.