[NATO] has all but ended combined operations with Afghan army and police forces at the tactical level, requiring general officer approval for exceptions....What that means is that the commander of a Brigade Combat Team -- who is an O-6, a Bird Colonel -- cannot approve a combined operation for any unit under his command.
Three years after doubling down on an unachievable mission, trust between NATO and Afghan forces is at an all-time low. Already this year, there have been thirty-six of these insider attacks, killing fifty-one NATO troops, most of them Americans.
Even before the latest policy announcement, Joint Chiefs chairman Martin Dempsey acknowledged the severity of the problem, declaring, "You can't whitewash it. We can't convince ourselves that we just have to work harder to get through it. Something has to change" and admitting that "It is a very serious threat to the campaign."
Let me put that another way. It's not just that the platoon leader can't approve it. He's a lieutenant. But his boss, the company commander, is a captain who probably has a tour as a platoon leader behind him. He can't approve it either.
But his boss, the battalion commander, is a Lieutenant Colonel. He was probably a company commander two tours ago, but then he pulled at least one tour as a staff officer either at the battalion or the brigade level. If he's the commander now, he was probably the operations officer for a battalion. As the ops officer, he supervised and was personally responsible for the writing of all the written orders that moved troops around the battlefield. That's a serious job. Whoever holds that job -- the battalion ops officer, Major Whoever -- he still can't write an order approving such a mission.
But a guy who was Major Whoever last tour is now is the battalion commander. He was good enough at that job to get picked up for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel with appointment to a command spot. At this level things are getting pretty competitive. He's somebody who was good as a company commander, outstanding as a major, and has now out-competed a bunch of his fellow LTCs -- the ones who lost out are now pulling operations officer gigs at the brigade, or similarly employed elsewhere. This guy was good enough to get command. He can't approve the mission either.
And his boss can't approve the mission. He's a full-bird colonel, who perhaps was a battalion commander on his last tour. Not only that, he was one of the best battalion commanders: one of a few battalion commanders who got picked for further advancement in line combat command. Now he's back, commanding a brigade in the same country where his unit has probably deployed multiple times in a ten year war. He outranks all but a few hundred guys in the entire army. Most of those guys are not in Afghanistan, making him perhaps the highest ranking officer in a hundred miles. He still can't approve any platoon or company in his area of operations taking a walk outside the wire with an Afghan unit.
He has to go to Division for permission. That's the first level at which you'll find an actual General Officer. Probably he has to talk to the Deputy Commanding General, Maneuver, (DCG-M) for whichever division has command of his area. Maybe he has to bring it up with the actual Division Commander, a two-star general.
That guy is going to approve whatever his brigade commander asks him to approve. But only so many missions can get pushed up through this many levels of abstraction. That's significant friction, as Clausewitz would say.
You can't fight a war this way, but apparently the administration has no intention of fighting one. They just don't want to finish losing it until after the election. Our soldiers and Marines, airmen and a few bold sailors are buying them that time. We ought to know for just what they are being asked to barter their blood.
It's for nothing, now.
ReplyDelete"It's for nothing, now. "
ReplyDeleteI'm afraid I agree.
I hate to say that this reminds me of another time/place, about 44 years ago +/-, when the will of the nation/politicos did not square with the sacrifices made to execute national policy.
Nah, I won't say that, nor armchair quarterback the matter other than to say, at this point, Linebacker III may end up being an option.
My analysis may be way off, but when Petraeus asked for 80,000, or 40,000, or nothing, and Obama gave him 32,000, it seemed pretty clear Obama wasn't interested in winning.
ReplyDeleteI'm rusty on the math, but I believe the number 32,000 was derived from the branch of math known as political calculus, and for the given variables at that time was the only possible result of the equation "how can we get out of this and not get blamed for losing".
I'm rusty on the math, but I believe the number 32,000 was derived from the branch of math known as political calculus, and for the given variables at that time was the only possible result of the equation "how can we get out of this and not get blamed for losing".
ReplyDeleteBingo.
Here's a question then- clearly if Obama wins (God help us) we need to get out asap. If Romney wins, what should he do? Pull out? Stay, but drastically change course? Something else? I'm torn on this now, and I was a pretty strong supporter of staying and developing a few years ago.
ReplyDeleteI spoke with a friend last night who is in a position to know, and he confirms that this story is true. There are a couple of exceptions: Brigade/Battalion commanders can still go on battlefield circulation with Afghans because their personal security details are large enough, and a BCT can approve battalion-level maneuvers. However, no tactical units can move jointly with Afghans without a general officer chopping off on it.
ReplyDeleteIf Romney wins, what should he do? Pull out? Stay, but drastically change course? Something else?
ReplyDeleteIf it were me, I'd form everybody up and march them to the sea for extraction -- via Iran, and stopping to lay waste to every nuclear facility along the road. Yes, seriously.
Interesting idea. But they might just have to do that via Pakistan.
ReplyDelete"Grim said...
ReplyDeleteIf it were me, I'd form everybody up and march them to the sea for extraction -- via Iran, and stopping to lay waste to every nuclear facility along the road. Yes, seriously.
1:58 PM
Eric Blair said...
Interesting idea. But they might just have to do that via Pakistan"
Linebacker III, to blaze the trail to the sea.
I don't know that any of this is still up for discussion. After all, the Afghans get a vote, too. It's their country.
ReplyDeleteWe have negotiated agreements in place, even if Teh Won kind of phoned that in before flying over there to spike the football and bask in the admiration of the more evolved among us. On what basis would Romney be able to unilaterally revise them?
This is why I didn't get upset about him not talking about this on the campaign trail. It's mostly a done deal at this point. I don't understand how anyone would think we can turn this around on a dime - we're not acting alone over there, anyway.
I wasn't a big fan of the Surge strategy to begin with. It never really made sense (and the proof of that particular pudding was clearly shown by casualties going UP post-Surge, rather than down as they did in Iraq). If it ain't making things better AND we have openly announced our intent to skedaddle on a date certain, it's hard to see the point.
I understand risking our guys and gals lives when there's a mission, but we really don't have much of one at this point (unless running out the clock can be considered to be a mission). That's not worth risking US lives over in my mind.
If you're talking about the US-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, that was unilaterally negotiated by President Obama -- at least, in terms of the US government. This isn't a treaty that the Senate has ratified, which binds the executive; there's no reason a President Romney can't renegotiate the agreement.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, that agreement does not specify troop levels or funding levels (which was pitched as a strength by the negotiators -- 'Hey, look how flexible we're being' -- but in fact the refusal to involve the Republican-influenced Congress meant that no such commitments by us were possible). Thus, what we are obligated to do -- insofar as we choose to be obligated -- is to "seek funding from Congress" at some level on an annual basis. The agreement commits Afghanistan to permitting us the "possibility" of US forces in country, but doesn't impose on us the obligation to have them there.
"I wasn't a big fan of the Surge strategy to begin with. It never really made sense (and the proof of that particular pudding was clearly shown by casualties going UP post-Surge, rather than down as they did in Iraq)."
ReplyDeleteI'm pretty sure that with the Iraq surge, casualties went up initially (as you'd expect from an uptempo in activities) and then over time, went down to below initial levels. Afghanistan is different in that you'd still expect them to go up, but how would they go down if you're sticking around, but shooting yourself in the foot by saying 'we'll be leaving shortly, get used to the idea of being back under the Taliban soon'. Every MAM and his Uncle knows which side their bread will be buttered on soon enough, and might as well start making nice with their old/new overlords, since we'll be offering nothing worth having in the long run.
Perhaps the question should have been 'what do you think Romney will do?'. As much as I like your suggestion, Grim, I have a hunch that isn't what we'll be doing.
ReplyDeleteI genuinely have no idea what he might do. He hasn't discussed it in terms that sound like strategic thinking rather than campaign speeches.
ReplyDeleteThe person to ask would be John Noonan, formerly of the milblog OP-FOR. He is Mitt Romney's Defense Policy Adviser. I met him once, and he seemed like a decent guy. His Twitter account is here.
I wonder what's possible at this point.
ReplyDeleteSerious question: Could any change in policy and / or investment of time/troops/money produce a better result?
By any, I don't want to leave anything realistic off the table.
What do you folks think?
My sense is that the most-likely option for improving success is allowing the loss of southern/western Afghanistan, and cutting a deal with the old Northern Alliance. They provide us with safe havens from which to strike in the Uzbek territories where the Taliban and Haqqani are largely (though not totally) ineffective, and we help ride herd on their problems. That turns Afghanistan into a long-term counter-terror mission.
ReplyDeleteA complete withdrawal is also an option.
Trying to defend Afghanistan's current borders, without invading Pakistan and at decreased troop levels, is just a recipe for losing American lives. We've lost the majority of lives lost in Afghanistan since Obama began his pseudo-surge, and it will only get worse if we try to maintain the ground facts without the troops (and with badly damaged trust between us and the Afghans we are supposed to be training).
I don't want to leave anything realistic off the table.
ReplyDeleteand
My sense is that the most-likely option for improving success....
First, define success. Recall the mission in Afghanistan--an implementation of the Bush Doctrine: go into Afghanistan, burn al-Qaeda and the Taliban to the ground, and get out.
But that was before all this mission-creep sewage that morphed the mission into nation-building and making nice. Thb-b-b-b-t.
Probably failing the first criterion--realistic--but go back to the original mission, finish burning the Taliban (we do seem to have largely and substantially succeeded with al_Qaeda in Afghan), and get out.
Eric Hines
Originally, the Taliban weren't the issue: we wanted the 9/11 planners. The Taliban only became an issue because they refused to turn them over, unless we could provide proof of their guilt acceptable to a Sha'riah court. (This requires three eye-witnesses -- a standard we could meet now, but not at the time.)
ReplyDeleteOur vengeance obligation is settled. What we do now are things we are free to do. One way or the other, we can decide what it is worth to us. That may not be much, in spite of the terrible price we have paid.
Our vengeance obligation is settled.
ReplyDeleteNot vengeance--destruction of a murderous, evil enemy. There is a difference. And the Taliban were in issue from the jump: "and those who harbor them."
... in spite of the terrible price we have paid.
Without denigrating the losses incurred by our soldiers and their families, and our nation, the terribleness of the price in aggregate stands next to the price paid at Verdun and Sommes, and at Okinawa, Iwo, and at too many other locations in those two 20th century wars.
We will continue to suffer--and ultimately bleed to death from--today's relative thousands of cuts unless and until we recognize our need for total war against those who are conducting this war against us whose sole purpose is to enslave or exterminate us.
Apologizing to our murderers, the strategy of the guy who occasionally sits in our President's chair, is a very strange strategy, indeed. In the meantime, his present antics (I hesitate to call it a strategy or a tactic) in Afghanistan is just murdering American soldiers as surely as if they were simply in an American building when a terrorist blew it up with a truck bomb. Fish or cut bait.
Eric Hines
Not vengeance--destruction of a murderous, evil enemy. There is a difference.
ReplyDeleteIndeed, which is why I said "vengeance." It is important, when dealing with an honor culture that you accept no insult without what Raymond Chandler called 'a due and dispassionate revenge.'
That's why the apology tour has not produced the results the President was expecting. His ideology says that the problem is our arrogance, and humility and apology will soothe the troubles. The truth is exactly otherwise: they will accept peace from a proud man who offers it, but not from a weak one who does not avenge his (or his country's) honor.
Eric,
ReplyDeleteHow would you go about burning the Taliban at this point?
Grim,
From your point about honor cultures, I'd like to segue into something that's been gnawing on me lately. Since both our allies and enemies in Afghanistan seem basically tribal, shouldn't we fight this war along tribal lines and in tribal ways? (Assuming we still have meaningful objectives to achieve there, of course.)
That is, if we identify a particular group of terrorists who have killed some of ours as belonging to a particular tribe, shouldn't we then hold that tribe responsible for their actions? When the US recognizes it has unintentionally killed the wrong people, we pay the blood price to their kin. When tribal members kill some of ours, shouldn't we either avenge the deaths of our troops or demand the blood price from the tribe? In effect, shouldn't the US act as a tribe in Afghanistan?
The tribal structure in Afghanistan has already been atomized by the Russians, whose brutality we can't hope to match. The problem with an outright war against the tribe is that you kill off the people who have the authority to negotiate a peace, and make it stick.
ReplyDeleteFor that reason we have what you're calling an "essentially" tribal structure, but without a tribal leader who can make peace. (The Haqqani may be an exception here.) We end up trying 'tribal' solutions above and below the tribal level: with individual warlords or families, or at the ethnic level (i.e., we're doing pretty well with the Uzbeks; we have a problem with the Pashtuns). The one isn't very effective because an individual family is much easier to subject to the kind of terroristic pressure that the Taliban excel at; the other because a vague ethnic loyalty only goes so far. You might hate us for being 'against' Pashtuns, but you certainly won't love us because we built a water treatment plant for some very distant Pashtuns who are unrelated to you.
How would you go about burning the Taliban at this point?
ReplyDeleteNo clue. But I had no clue when we first went in, with view to burn an al-Qaeda who were as diffuse as the Taliban now seem to be.
It may be as "simple" as going back to the strategy, tactics, and methods we used so successfully against the al-Qaeda. Or it may require something else.
If the experts can't figure it out, though (and Martin Dempsey is none such), it's time to cut bait, even with our major objectives not completely achieved. Practice bleeding is what we do for ORI preparation. There's no need to practice with real blood.
Eric Hines
Thank you both for your answers.
ReplyDeleteIf it were easy to solve in our current way of thinking, it would have been done. I guess I was hoping there was some rogue thinking going on that could lead somewhere, maybe a radical change in the way we conduct warfare or in foreign policy.
Something like dealing quite differently with the tribes, or buying the entire opium crop, or going into parts of Pakistan to eliminate safe havens, or actually putting another 80,000 troops on the ground in a significant surge, or etc.
Something current policy makes impossible, but with a change of administration might become possible.
So were we, or were we not making actual progress before the current administration subverted the surge and made our guys targets for a few years till we pulled out?
ReplyDeleteIf it was always hopeless, then it would be partly correct to say it was Bush's fault, and that Obama's only fault was not getting out faster. Is that what we're saying?
We made actual progress up until the point that they decided to move in heavy forces and become battlespace owners. That was the core mistake as I see it, and it was a Bush-era mistake. This was a Special Forces operation, one that went extremely well until we decided to make it a conventional operation. There are some operations for which conventional forces are ideal, but this was a class mission for Army Special Forces. We should have left them in the lead, in which case we'd be in a much happier place.
ReplyDeleteObama didn't derail a surge that Bush started; he derailed his own. He is responsible for a supermajority of the American deaths in this war, because of the way he mishandled the surge. It was a fish or cut bait moment, but he decided to split the difference.