Katrina-Iraq-MOE

Measures of Effectiveness:

"MOE" is military-speak for anything you can use to measure and track progress toward a given goal. Here are two, for the success of the mission in Iraq.

I. A Gift

Iraq's Red Crescent Donates $1 million to Katrina victims. (H/t Greyhawk).

"I wish we could have a billion dollars to give," Said Hakki, the organization's president, said by telephone from Baghdad. "Even then, it is not enough to show our appreciation for what the U.S. has done for Iraq and is still doing."

In the early days after Katrina, Bangladesh donated $1 million as well. It was a great shock, as the government of Bangladesh is run by a coalition of three parties, two of which are Islamist in outlook. They remembered what we had done during the tsunami, though, and wanted to do right by us in turn.

How much does that mean in the 'hearts and minds' war? Bangladesh's Islamist movement has what Daniel was calling 'shame cultures,' so it is possible to read the generosity in the wrong way. The motive in Bangladesh is less likely to be a sense of love, than the desire to avoid the shame of being seen less generous than the American. So, a generous gift from Bangladesh does not prove that we have won hearts or minds.

On the other hand, it doesn't have to: establishing reciprocal bonds of honor and duty works almost as well. Love is better, because it will drive actions taken in secret as well as those taken in public. But if you can't have love, honor and duty is the next best thing.

How does the Iraq gift appear in that light? Iraqi Muslims also participate in a shame culture. The gift in this case, however, appears to be given not out of a sense of duty, but out of a sense of love. The Red Crescent is a self-selecting group, made up of people who are likely to express fellow-feeling through charitable giving. It can't be read as revealing for all of Iraqi society. Nevertheless, with those caveats said, we have to read this as a strongly positive MOE.

II. Iraqi Operations

Iraq's vice president reports that Iraqi forces now implement 70% of security operations. Mackubin Thomas Owens notes that, if the standard is "US-Iraqi or independent Iraqi operations," the figure is 80%.

Bill Roggio noted in an email yesterday traveling on a certain highway in Iraq, the name of which I will leave out for OPSEC reasons. It was, as he reminded us, a highway that had always been extremely dangerous -- until Iraqi forces were able to take it over. They are more effective at many kinds of security operations because (a) they speak the language, and (b) they all naturally understand the culture, and (c) they can more easily spot someone who doesn't belong. That leaves them especially capable of handling the "hold" part of "clear and hold" operations, and other similar security ops.

But wait, that's not all. As the COUNTERCOLUMN points out, the Iraqi Army is now conducting air assault missions.

Air assaults are very challenging, involving a great deal of staff work and specialized troop training. They can stretch officers and NCOs to the limit. The fact that Iraqi troops are now capable of conducting air assaults alongside the 101st, the masters of the art, is very encouraging. Will any national news outlets grasp the significance of this development? Nope.

Again, the MOE here is strongly positive. Far from depressed, we ought to be most encouraged by the recent progress.