FLoS

"The Far Line of Sand"

The Belmont Club has an excellent post on littoral warfare, and US Navy efforts to prepare for its increased importance. Another critical warfighting system here is the Virginia class submarine, which is always under attack from Congressional budget cutters (giant bridges to nowhere in Alaska, yes; important naval warships, no).

A little known truth about submarines is this: the diesel ones, which are put into battle by third-world nations like Chile, are stealthier than ours. For one thing, you can turn a diesel engine completely off, rendering it perfectly silent. You can lay on the bottom, listen for anything suspicious on your sonar, and give it a torpedo. This is one thing that gives rise to what Wretchard accurately notes: the US Navy may rule the blue water, but it isn't currently capable of dominating close-to-shore conflicts. This is important: Taiwan, the Malacca straits, and a number of other potentially critical battlespaces are exactly where we are vulnerable to third-world (i.e., asymmetrical) power.

The whole battle with submarines is information, and stealth is a huge part of that battle. Stealth is how you keep information about your subs away from the enemy: where are they, what is their course, what do I need to know to program a torpedo to hit it? Because we are wedded to nuclear technology, partially because we need the range-without-refuelling that you can't get with diesels, we have to make up with high-level information technology what we are losing in stealth.

Braiding in C4ISR technology with advanced stealth technology is the only way to make up for what we're losing by not being able to field diesels. Once again, the symmetry/asymmetry model means that we have to be at our very best to compete with people who aren't nearly as capable on their own.