Wang

A Letter from China:

Wang Jisi is a classic figure from the Chinese landscape: a scholar with influence at the court. He is, in fact, dean of the school of International Studies at an important Chinese university (which in Chinese is DaShui, lit. "Big School"). But more important than that is his position at the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party.

Dr. Wang has produced a paper for the journal of the Central Party School, which was revised and expanded for publication in English. It appears in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs, and can be read here. It is an interesting document in several respects.

The first thing that is interesting about it is its circumstances. The paper, in its earlier Chinese form, will have been read and debated at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party. That they desired to see it "revised" and then issued in English is notable. It purports to be a piece of analysis from a respected scholar; it is in fact a letter from China's rulers as a whole. Dr. Wang is just far enough from the halls of power to let them speak without making formal promises; yet he is so close to those halls that we cannot doubt that they gave their blessing to his words.

Wang begins:

The United States is currently the only country with the capacity and the ambition to exercise global primacy, and it will remain so for a long time to come. This means that the United States is the country that can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China. Although in recent years Beijing has refrained from identifying Washington as an adversary or criticizing its "hegemonism" -- a pejorative Chinese code word for U.S. dominance -- many Chinese still view the United States as a major threat to their nation's security and domestic stability.

He is telling us that China has been trying to be friendly. But he also is giving us the formula, so we will understand what follows. Throughout the piece, Wang writes according to this formula: without formal reference to "hegemony," in friendly terms that play up the need for cooperation rather than competition, but explaining why China might reasonably view the United States as a threat.

That formula is followed precisely. When he speaks of US policy, it isn't "hegemony," but a "global security policy." He explains his understanding of US interests, so we will know that he is sympathetic:

Further bolstering U.S. primacy is the fact that many of the country's potential competitors, such as the European Union, Russia, and Japan, face internal problems that will make it difficult for them to overtake the United States anytime soon. For a long time to come, the United States is likely to remain dominant, with sufficient hard power to back up aggressive diplomatic and military policies.

From a Chinese perspective, the United States' geopolitical superiority was strengthened in 2001 by Washington's victory in the Afghan war. The United States has now established political, military, and economic footholds in Central Asia and strengthened its military presence in Southeast Asia, in the Persian Gulf, and on the Arabian Peninsula. These moves have been part of a global security strategy that can be understood as having one center, two emphases. Fighting terrorism is the center. And the two emphases are securing the Middle East and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The greater Middle East, a region stretching from Kashmir to Morocco and from the Red Sea to the Caucasus, is vital to U.S. interests. Rich in oil and natural gas, the region is also beset by ethnic and religious conflicts and is a base for rampant international terrorism. None of the countries in the area is politically stable, and chaos there can affect the United States directly, as the country learned on September 11.

On the nonproliferation front, the United States' main concerns are Iran and North Korea, two states that are striving to develop nuclear technology and have long been antagonistic toward Washington. In 2004, the United States carried out the largest redeployment of its overseas forces since World War II in order to meet these challenges.

Note particularly the list of 'potential US competitors': "European Union, Russia, and Japan." The absence of China from that list is not an accident, but a statement -- even an invitation.

We all know that China is grieved, and concerned, with the US military bases in central and southeast Asia. Wang brings them up early in his list of places where the US is exerting power, and recognizes the strength of the position. But he defuses it from being an issue between us and them: "These moves have been part of a global security strategy that can be understood as having one center, two emphases. Fighting terrorism is the center. And the two emphases are securing the Middle East and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."

This is part of the mindset of classical China, which influenced much of Asia in the days when they were ascendant. Social harmony requires "a beautiful mask" to cover "the ugly truth." Politeness, a central duty of everyone, means upholding that mask to prevent the webs of social harmony from being disturbed. It is not that anyone actually believes it -- it is that everyone adheres to it, that harmony can be maintained in spite of everything.

Here we are given that mask as a gift. China's Communists are making us an offer. They are willing to pretend to see our actions in that context, if we will pretend that that is the only context for them.

The rest of the piece is much the same. It is a fascinating read because it lays out how China is prepared to meet us halfway on the great issues of the day. Iraq, Asia, economics: from first to last, with one exception, we are being offered an understanding for mutual benefit. That one exception of course is Taiwan -- it is the condition on which all this is laid.

History has already proved that the United States is not China's permanent enemy. Nor does China want the United States to see it as a foe. Deng Xiaoping's prediction that "things will be all right when Sino-U.S. relations eventually improve" was a cool judgment based on China's long-term interests. To be sure, aspirations cannot replace reality. The improvement of Chinese-U.S. relations will be slow, tortuous, limited, and conditional, and could even be reversed in the case of certain provocations (such as a Taiwanese declaration of independence). It is precisely for this reason that the thorny problems in the bilateral relationship must be handled delicately, and a stable new framework established to prevent troubles from disrupting an international environment favorable for building prosperous societies. China's leadership is set on achieving such prosperity by the middle of the twenty-first century; with Washington's cooperation, there is little to stand in its way.

Should we accept the deal that has been placed on the table? Much depends on how much we trust the Communists to keep their word. Yet the offer is backed, not merely with promises, but with reason. The explanations for why the United States and China have aligned interests are compelling. Having lived in China, too, I sense that they will adhere to the mask once they don it -- so long as we do also. If we accept what is offered, it will become in their mind a matter of honor to uphold the masks that protect the greater harmony.

The deal is much starker when it is viewed the way Americans like to view things. We prefer the ugly truth, and here it is: Taiwan for peace. If we will do that, speak more kindly of them, pretend that our interests are what they have described them to be -- they don't care if we change our policies a whit, just how we talk about them -- then we can have peace, and all the benefits that are laid out before us in the document. Yet it contains, plainly but softly, the threat of war if we do not accept.

It is a kingly document, courtly and well-spoken. Every word of it is structured and considered, and every word -- in its fashion -- is meant. We must think carefully what answer to make, and where our interests lie.