tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5173950.post7734660021330336341..comments2024-03-28T21:41:32.110-04:00Comments on Grim's Hall: The limits of scientismGrimhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07543082562999855432noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5173950.post-32908147538786664832012-04-28T10:20:36.294-04:002012-04-28T10:20:36.294-04:00His analogy of the elephant and the rider to expla...<i>His analogy of the elephant and the rider to explain the difficulty "will" has in directing behavior is by itself worth the price of admission.</i><br /><br />I agree, Elise.<br /><br />I don't think I've ever read a book that presents any sort of unified theory that solves all our moral problems. In this, Haidt's work is no exception.<br /><br />What I find remarkable about both books is that, while maintaining that most people are far less rational and objective than we like to think we are, he actually managed to do what he argues (in both books) is extremely difficult: step outside his own narrow frame of reference and emotional reactions to achieve some understanding of how other people think.<br /><br />You have to do this, to some extent, to have a strong marriage but then you have powerful incentives egging you on. In politics or religion there is no such powerful reward system in place (and several powerful incentives pushing you in the other direction). His understanding of conservatism and religion is still tinged by some remnant of his progressive belief system, but it would be weird if that weren't the case.<br /><br />The goal isn't conversion, but some degree of understanding and respect, mixed in with a healthy amount of skepticism wrt our own ineffable rectitude. I think he achieves that nicely.Cassnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5173950.post-23972901638192853052012-04-27T19:16:12.041-04:002012-04-27T19:16:12.041-04:00I'm about halfway through the earlier Haidt bo...I'm about halfway through the earlier Haidt book, <i>The Happiness Philosophy</i>. I can see the flaws in this book but it is nevertheless a fascinating book and well worth the time and effort. His analogy of the elephant and the rider to explain the difficulty "will" has in directing behavior is by itself worth the price of admission.<br /><br /><br />It sounds like his new book is much the same: flawed but worthwhile.Elisehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06594477709835944165noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5173950.post-8467176469841982902012-04-27T14:31:09.873-04:002012-04-27T14:31:09.873-04:00Jonathan Haidt's new book is so broad in its s...Jonathan Haidt's new book is so broad in its scope that I can only comment on one aspect: the relationship between conscience and morality. He says that political (secular) and religious views of morality frequently divide people. Many of us may have both in intuitive and learned behavior. In my free ebook on comparative mysticism, <i>"the greatest achievement in life,"</i> is a chapter called "Duel of the dual." Here are four paragraphs from it:<br /><br /> The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology defines <b>conscience</b> as <i>“a reasonably coherent set of internalized moral principals that provides evaluations of right and wrong with regard to acts either performed or contemplated. Historically, theistic views aligned conscience with the voice of God and hence regarded it as innate. The contemporary view is that the prohibitions and obligations of conscience are learned."</i> <br /><br /> The Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion lists some interesting historical observations on the word. Socrates said that conscience was the inner warning voice of God. Among Stoics it was a divine spark in man. Throughout the Middle Ages, conscience, <i>synderesis</i> in Greek, was universally binding rules of conduct. Religious interpretations later changed in psychiatry.<br /><br /> Sigmund Freud had coined a new term for conscience; he called it “superego.” This was self-imposed standards of behavior we learned from parents and our community, rather than from a divine source. People who transgressed those rules felt guilt. Carl Jung, Freud’s famous contemporary, said that conscience was an archetype of a “collective unconscious”; content from society is learned later. Most religions still view conscience as the foundation of morality.<br /><br /> Perhaps conscience can be viewed as a double-pane window, with the self in between. On one side, it looks toward ego and free will to obey community’s laws. On the other side, it is toward the soul and divine will to follow universal law. They often converge to dictate the same, or a similar, course of conduct…and sometimes not. The moral dilemma is when these two views conflict.Ron Krumposhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/05371279514024960026noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5173950.post-17308716098916587602012-04-27T11:31:15.049-04:002012-04-27T11:31:15.049-04:00This strikes me as the core of the critique:
A sh...This strikes me as the core of the critique:<br /><br /><i>A shift of meaning occurs when “morality” is used as a theoretical category in a putative scientific discipline. In everyday parlance, “morality” is a term heavily freighted with value: to call something moral is to distinguish it from things that are immoral or amoral, or to which moral judgments simply do not apply. When “morality” features as a theoretical category, this prescriptive element falls away. When “morality” becomes a term of art in a supposedly scientific discipline, there is no longer any difference between good and bad moralities.</i><br /><br />The point here is that, when we begin talking about "morality" as a kind of slot to be filled by anthropology or evolution, we're stuck with whatever we find in that slot. This group has such-and-such values put there; that group has this other set of values.<br /><br />When he speaks of 'slipping to ought from is' he is citing David Hume's objection to this problem: Hume held that you cannot go from 'is' to 'ought.' (I think Hume is entirely mistaken about this; if you are going to get an 'ought,' it can only be from the things that exist, and it only refers to the problems that occur within the realm of existence. But that's a long argument to the side: generally, Hume's concept is accepted.)<br /><br />The whole point of morality, Gray is arguing, is about how we judge competing claims -- to include group loyalties, honor, shame, harm to others we love, harm to others we don't love, harm to others we hate (these three kinds of harm usually have very different moral statuses, but not always -- think of the Quakers), truth, humanity and cosmopolitanism, and so forth. If we adopt a view of morality that is scientific, we lose the ability to make value judgments between these things: there is no <i>scientific</i> basis for doing so.<br /><br />In other words, Gray argues that we need a wholly separate way of determining "ought," rather than a better description of what "is."Grimhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07543082562999855432noreply@blogger.com