Nicomachean Ethics IX.3

When should you end a friendship?
Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes. For it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and when these have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are.

Fair enough, is it not? If you chose a friend because he amused you, you'd quit spending time with him if he didn't keep doing that; if you chose a friend because he was rich and bought you nice dinners, his poverty might end your friendship. Yet if you had convinced him that you really admired and respected him, and that's why you came to his dinners, he might reasonably be annoyed.

So when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when he has been deceived by the pretenses of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.

But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their wickedness?

This advice is a problem for Christians, who are advised to forgive everything and love their enemies. I don't have an answer to that problem. I'm just acknowledging it.

If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.

In a way I find that comment to be a strange thing for Aristotle to say, even though it's a perfectly ordinary sentiment that I don't think is controversial. The point of the Ethics is that virtue is a habitual character that is formed by repetition of good habits into firm characters. Here we see an acknowledgement that characters can deform, too, presumably in the same way: by bad habits that are allowed to continue unchallenged for a long time.

But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot live together. But we have discussed these matters.

Also a little surprising, this time because the emphasis is not on helping your friend -- here the friend doesn't even need to be 'saved,' as just a moment ago was the case in the paragraph before. It's about abandoning him for not becoming as virtuous as you did. And how virtuous is that, if you abandon your old friends because they stayed the same as they were when you were coming up together?

Also, how can you not be friends because they have childish intellects compared with your own? Children are often the most sincere of friends; except for their grandparents, perhaps, who befriend the children with a deep love and intensity. Aristotle has treated the family relationship as different from friendship, but in my experience it is of great value to pursue friendships with those much older, or much younger, than you are. Our habit of tending to keep to our own cohort is greatly limiting in terms of the experience we are exposed to (when younger) or that we convey (when older); and it is limiting in our perspectives as well. I already know what the world looked like to someone who grew up in the American South of the 1970s and early 80s; I can still learn what it looks like to someone who is coming up today.

I do get the point, of course. The young sometimes seem to not know anything at all, and teaching them the context they need to understand the problems can be tiresome. Yet it is worthy to do so, and far less laborious than trying to 'save' a fallen friend. As for the ones who never changed, well, managing consistency in an ever-changing world is not always to be despised.

Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards [the unchanged friend] than he would if he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.

I met an old friend the other day that I hadn't seen in more than twenty years. It turned out we had nothing to say to each other. She seemed to be doing well, and to have a perfectly satisfactory life without me imposing upon it; and while I remember her very gladly, I didn't feel that it was necessary or appropriate to press a renewal of our friendship. Probably something like that is what he means here; we remain friendly, but allow each other to pass by. If she had needed something of me, it would have been different; but she clearly didn't, and had learned to make her way without me. It's ok that we change, and move on, and lose touch even with treasured companions; that's the way the world works. We were together for a time, and mattered to each other once; once, but long ago. 

9 comments:

  1. Anonymous11:50 AM

    Aristotle: But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their wickedness?

    Grim: This advice is a problem for Christians, who are advised to forgive everything and love their enemies. I don't have an answer to that problem. I'm just acknowledging it.

    Is that a problem for Christians? Forgiveness doesn't mean one escapes the consequences in this lifetime, including the end of a friendship. Loving one's enemies doesn't mean loving their sins. I don't see any particular contradiction between what Aristotle says here and what is expected of Christians.

    Aristotle: If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.

    Grim: In a way I find that comment to be a strange thing for Aristotle to say, even though it's a perfectly ordinary sentiment that I don't think is controversial. The point of the Ethics is that virtue is a habitual character that is formed by repetition of good habits into firm characters. Here we see an acknowledgement that characters can deform, too, presumably in the same way: by bad habits that are allowed to continue unchallenged for a long time.

    What do you think is strange here? I don't see it.

    Also, the first part seems to be similar to the advice Christians get in Matthew 18:

    15 “If your brother sins against you, go and tell him his fault, between you and him alone. If he listens to you, you have gained your brother. 16 But if he does not listen, take one or two others along with you, that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. 17 If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector."

    Not quite the same, but not greatly different, I think.

    - Tom

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  2. "Is that a problem for Christians?"

    Well, no; you can reject the advice from Aristotle, and practically give yourself over to the commandments to forgive and love even your enemies. It's not really a problem unless you were taking Aristotle for a guide -- which, in fact, many great theologians have done.

    If you go that way, you will end up with a theology that endorses a moral duty of punishment that is somehow coupled with forgiveness: it was seen as the king's duty to enforce the law, however personally saddened he was every time he had to have someone executed. The priest's job was to administer the sacrament, thus saving the condemned's soul (perhaps; theology held that the sacraments were efficacious, but also that it's God's place to make the real judgment and determine what divine punishments follow).

    So it's been done; it's just a conflict that produces a lot of social structures that don't actually seem to be much about love or forgiveness. As Sir Walter Scott had the fool says in Ivanhoe when the lady says she forgives a knight "as a Christian," "That means she does not forgive him."

    The fool was performing his role, which is to speak the uncomfortable but honest truth in a way that could break the tension with humor.

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    1. Anonymous5:17 PM

      No, I meant that I don't see any contradiction between Aristotle's advice there and what is expected from a Christian. Forgiveness of sin brings us closer to God, but there are often consequences that still need to be suffered.

      That was true in the Old Testament as well. When God set up a nation, he set it up with laws and a system of justice. Yet there were sin offerings and forgiveness of sins. God doesn't change, does He? He was love in the Old Testament times just as He is love now.

      If love is a genuine desire for the good for a person, then loving one's enemies doesn't preclude harming them when it's necessary. We may sincerely hope a terrorist will turn from his wicked ways, find Jesus, repent and be saved. But if he tries to shoot you, you shoot him first if you can. (Unless you choose martyrdom; if he is trying to shoot you because you are a Christian, that's a valid choice.)

      I also don't know of any Christian reason why every social structure should be about love and forgiveness. God seems to be interested in justice being done as well.

      So, I genuinely don't see the problem you're talking about.

      - Tom

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    2. All right, I'll spell out the contradiction. Let's start here, and we'll get there shortly. First, there is less reason that a Greek polity would than that a Christian polity would try to include love as well as justice in all aspects of society. In Book IX we're talking about friendship and love; we were talking about justice in Book V. There's clearly no contradiction there: they're just different things. You have magistrates for justice and friends for love. Nobody expects you to love the magistrate, nor is it important that you do; and we just had a lengthy discussion of how 'justice' between friends differs quite significantly than the kind of justice that is lawfulness-plus-fairness. They both aim at establishing a sort-of equality that is really a proportion between unlike things; but the equalities are quite different between two citizens versus between two friends.

      The absence of the Christian commandment to Love the Lord your God, and in fact the presence of alternative pagan structures with many gods -- some of whom you wouldn't love at all, and even the best of whom had many bad stories about him, as Plato kept on about -- has some clear effects on the society of Aristotle and Alexander.

      The absence of the second commandment, "to love your neighbor as yourself," that does also. At this point we're talking about when you can stop loving your friends, to say nothing of your neighbors, and even less of loving enemies. That concept wouldn't have made sense; what we get instead is what we get here, "of course you can't love the bad, only the good," with not a commandment but some advice on when you can stop loving even those who were once closest and important to you but from whom you've grown apart.

      It's good advice; it's just not at all Christian advice. The core duty is completely absent, and when it gets introduced it finds itself at least in tension with this more pragmatic paganism.

      So here is the contradiction plainly stated: What does that duty now impose? For Aristotle you can't love the bad, only the good. But now we hear that you must love the bad, even the worst.

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    3. Anonymous4:08 PM

      Ah. I think the key bit is that Aristotle is saying the person is evil and so unlovable, while I was focusing on the idea that while a person may do evil things and so the things (actions) are unlovable, the person isn't evil and is thus lovable. It seems to be fairly rare to think of a person as evil; there's Hitler or Stalin or a serial killer, but generally people seem to think just doing a bad thing doesn't make one evil.

      Thanks for spelling this out.

      Another difference is that we're probably using a different definition of the word love than Aristotle does.

      - Tom

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  3. "What do you think is strange here? I don't see it."

    The sentiment is not itself strange; it's a very ordinary thing to think, and not controversial in itself.

    What's strange to me is to find it in a book of moral education premised on the system that people could be transformed through practice. If the virtues can be taught, why give up on teaching them?

    The verses from Matthew are presented in a Biblical context that even goes further than that, such as this passage from Deuteronomy (21:18-21):

    "If a man has a stubborn and rebellious son who will not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother, and who, when they have chastened him, will not heed them, then his father and his mother shall take hold of him and bring him out of the elders of his city, to the gate of the city. And they shall say to the elders of the city, “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton and a drunkard.” Then all the men of his city shall stone him to death with stones; so you shall put away the evil from among you, and all Israel shall hear and fear.

    Usually people like to contextualize that by pointing out that this is, in some ancient way, the equivalent of the judgment of the court today; it's not literally parents being urged to stone their children to death. But it is literally the community being urged to do it.

    Jesus' answer is much gentler than the old law answer, but it amounts to expulsion from the family and community. (A pragmatically serious matter in those days!) It's hard to square with forgiving everything, even your enemies, let alone your children.

    But domestic violence has been a permanent problem I guess. It could be there isn't a finally satisfactory answer.

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    1. Anonymous5:25 PM

      Here's a possibility loosely based on an experience I've had.

      I had a friend who was a lot of fun and we enjoyed drinking together. He was well-educated, witty, and pretty funny. But I noticed he kept a bottle of bourbon hidden at work, and one in his car, and whatever else we were doing together after work we were always drinking. So, I gently brought up the question of whether he might need to cut back on the drinking.

      He said, "Look, I'm an alcoholic. You only live once and this is how I want to spend the time. I enjoy it."

      Well, I knew that I myself was drinking too much and wanted to get better at moderation, so I stopped hanging out with him for the most part. Sure, I showed up for the occasional special occasion or whatever, but we slowly stopped being friends. At some point he moved away, and I wasn't invited to the going away party. And that was OK.

      - Tom

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    2. It's a good Aristotelian story.

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  4. Speaking of Biblical punishment of children, one fairly effective punishment is just to read to them from that passage from Deuteronomy!

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