Nicomachean Ethics I.8

We must consider it, ["it" meaning this general inquiry into ethics] however, in the light not only of our conclusion and our premisses, but also of what is commonly said about it; for with a true view all the data harmonize, but with a false one the facts soon clash. Now goods have been divided into three classes, and some are described as external, others as relating to soul or to body; we call those that relate to soul most properly and truly goods, and psychical actions and activities we class as relating to soul. Therefore our account must be sound, at least according to this view, which is an old one and agreed on by philosophers.

Philosophers rarely agree on anything, so that is itself a remarkable finding. Except it isn't true:

It is correct also in that we identify the end with certain actions and activities; for thus it falls among goods of the soul and not among external goods. Another belief which harmonizes with our account is that the happy man lives well and does well; for we have practically defined happiness as a sort of good life and good action. The characteristics that are looked for in happiness seem also, all of them, to belong to what we have defined happiness as being. For some identify happiness with virtue, some with practical wisdom, others with a kind of philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one of these, accompanied by pleasure or not without pleasure; while others include also external prosperity. Now some of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few eminent persons; and it is not probable that either of these should be entirely mistaken, but rather that they should be right in at least some one respect or even in most respects.

Indeed, we see that the philosophers don't actually agree! Some say this, and some say that. Here Aristotle is ready to accept that they might at least each have part of the answer. 

With those who identify happiness with virtue or some one virtue our account is in harmony; for to virtue belongs virtuous activity.

Again, an ethical life is lived virtuously; just having virtues you don't use doesn't count. 

But it makes, perhaps, no small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a man who is asleep or in some other way quite inactive, but the activity cannot; for one who has the activity will of necessity be acting, and acting well. And as in the Olympic Games it is not the most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned but those who compete (for it is some of these that are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly win, the noble and good things in life.

This restatement of that point may remind you of Theodore Roosevelt's famous speech about the man in the arena, which was actually called "Citizenship in a Republic." 

Their life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. Now for most men their pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself.

This is an interesting argument: the virtuous life is pleasant because to live it you must be virtuous, and if you are virtuous you must love virtue. Since you love virtue, you will love to see and perform virtuous actions. Thus, it will not only be a morally good life you will lead, it will be a pleasing life.

That may be true, but it is not obvious. Many men practice the virtue of moderation in eating and drinking, but only because they don't wish to become fat or hung-over, not because they don't enjoy delicious food and strong ale. It is pleasing to discover that you can control yourself and walk away from temptations you know you ought; but is it as pleasing as the night you could have had if you didn't? Aristotle says it is: you'll be pleased by doing right, once you develop a character that is habituated to loving doing right.  

For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases.

This is a return to the proper upbringing: you learn what is noble by hearing stories from your elders about noble things that have been done. Part of developing a moral character fit for the good life is developing this taste for the good, the noble, the just, the upright.  

If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgement is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world, and these attributes are not severed as in the inscription at Delos-

Most noble is that which is justest, and best is health;

But pleasantest is it to win what we love.

For all these properties belong to the best activities; and these, or one- the best- of these, we identify with happiness.

N.B. "what," and not "whom," we love. You might have thought, as I have too, that winning the heart of your beloved was most pleasant. 

Yet evidently, as we said, it needs the external goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble acts without the proper equipment.

This is more evident to Aristotle, for whom citizenship required service in armor: Socrates fought three campaigns in the Peloponnesian War, and was a hero for his actions in the rear guard during a famous retreat, and for saving the life of Alcibiades at Potidaea. You needed some wealth to fund armor, horses were valuable -- recall Xenophon here -- and so forth. In the Middle Ages, you needed a whole array of support to field a knight in armor who had been able to spend time training in such combat.

There is a virtue we will encounter later that points to the kind of goods that only the very rich can afford: Magnificence. Even a man of otherwise complete virtue may not be able to afford magnificence. It's for men like Elon Musk to build starships; none of us can do it, no matter how upright we are otherwise. That comes a bit later on, though, so I will leave it except to note it in passing. 

In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of which takes the lustre from happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; for the man who is very ugly in appearance or ill-born or solitary and childless is not very likely to be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less likely if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good children or friends by death.

This is the Stoics' problem: see the commentary on Epictetus on the sidebar.  Epictetus was a slave, after all, and managed to be happy through virtue alone. The Stoics come a bit later on, however. 

As we said, then, happiness seems to need this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify happiness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.